LEGISLATIVE LIBRARY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA
3 3298 00263 5192
102-02727/

STATES/BRITISH COLUMBIA OIL SPILL TASK FORCE

2001 ANNUAL REPORT

Editor: JEAN CAMERON
Executive Coordinator
States/British Columbia Oil Spill Task Force

Art, Design & Production: CHRISTY SUTTON
Sutton Design Ventures

Printed on recycled paper

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PREFACE	PAGE 1
MISSION, GOALS AND OBJECTIVES	2
FROM THE EXECUTIVE COORDINATOR	3
2000-2001 IN REVIEW	6
Oil Spill Task Force Activities and Accomplishments	6
Task Force Member Agency Activities and Accomplishments	33
Alaska	33
British Columbia	35
Washington	37
Oregon	41
California	46
Hawaii	48
KEY TASK FORCE PERSONNEL	52
DOCUMENTS LIST	53



Four Pacific Coast states and the Province of British Columbia combined resources in 1989 to form the States/British Columbia Oil Spill Task Force. The map shows important transboundary marine transportation routes for crude and refined oil that may potentially impact Task Force members.

PREFACE

This Annual Report of the States/British Columbia Oil Spill Task Force is submitted to the Premier of British Columbia and the Governors of California, Oregon, Washington, and Alaska, as well as to the citizens whom they represent. It provides information on the activities and accomplishments of the Task Force and its member jurisdictions from August 2000 through July 2001, which is the period of activity between Task Force Annual Meetings.

The States/British Columbia Oil Spill Task Force was formally created by a Memorandum of Cooperation signed in 1989, following two West Coast oil spill incidents. The first involved the barge Nestucca, which spilled oil impacting the coasts of Washington and British Columbia in December of 1988. The second incident was the catastrophic spill by the T/V Exxon Valdez in Alaska's Prince William Sound in March of 1989. These events highlighted common concerns shared by West Coast states and the Province of British Columbia related to spill risks from coastal vessel traffic, the need for cooperation across shared borders, and a shared commitment among West Coast citizens of both the US and Canada to protect their unique marine resources.

The Oil Spill Task Force produced a major report in October of 1990 that included 46 joint recommendations for spill prevention and response, as well as recommendations specific to each member's jurisdiction. Most of these recommendations have since been incorporated into state or provincial statutes, rules, or programs. They are also reflected in the US Federal Oil Pollution Act passed in 1990 (OPA '90), as well as the Canadian Shipping Act Amendments adopted in 1993.

As state/provincial and federal policies and programs are implemented, the continuing focus of the Task Force is on fostering regulatory compatibility, sharing information and resources, and coordinating development and implementation of new policies and programs to improve oil spill prevention, preparedness, and response on the West Coast of the US and Canada. These efforts are guided by our five-year Strategic Plans (1994-1999, 1999-2004) and based on our Mission, Goals, and Objectives as stated on the following page.

◆

This Annual Report does not reflect oil spill prevention and response activities on the part of any federal agencies or industry organizations except as may have occurred in response to or in cooperation with the States/British Columbia Oil Spill Task Force or a member jurisdiction.

GOALS, MISSION, and OBJECTIVES

OUR MISSION:

The mission of the States/British Columbia Oil Spill Task Force is to strengthen member agency efforts to prevent, prepare for, and respond to oil spills in US and Canadian Pacific coastal waters by exchanging information, sharing resources, promoting a consistent approach to regulatory standards, collaborating with key stakeholders to address shared concerns, reviewing current legislative authorizations and making recommendations for necessary changes, and advocating for our common interest on national and international issues.

OUR GOALS:

To prevent oil spills in US and Canadian Pacific coastal waters, both large spills that occur rarely but cause catastrophic impacts, and small spills that occur daily and have an equally devastating cumulative effect.

To coordinate communication, policy development, response capabilities, prevention and preparedness initiatives, and education in order to maximize efficiency of effort; to learn from one another and share ideas and "products."

To clarify the roles and responsibilities of state and provincial agencies and federal agencies in order to reduce regulatory gaps, overlaps, and conflicts.

To advocate in national and international arenas on selected issues of common concern, earning respect through credibility, clarity of purpose, and collaboration.

To work cooperatively with federal agencies, vessel operators, the oil industry, response contractors, interest groups, and all concerned citizens to create opportunities for political and technological breakthroughs by serving as a catalyst for progressive change.

To educate the public on the impacts of oil spills and issues relating to spill prevention, response, and remediation.

To serve as a model of cooperation and coordination for the rest of North America.

OUR OBJECTIVES

Spill Prevention: Define and implement either regulatory or public/private partnership programs which effectively prevent oil spills and water pollution from vessels, facilities, recreational boating activities, and pipelines.

Spill Preparedness and Response: Enhance response capabilities in US and Canadian Pacific coastal waters.

Communications: Improve communications within the Task Force and with the general public as well as with key stakeholders, and maintain a high level of public and stakeholder involvement in Task Force activities.

FROM THE EXECUTIVE COORDINATOR



Dear Reader,

This year marks a significant milestone for the States/British Columbia Oil Spill Task Force. The state of Hawaii decided to join its Pacific sister states as a Oil Spill Task Force member this year. We feel greatly honored by their decision. Effective August 1 of 2001, Hawaii's Environmental Health Administration will be a member agency, with Gary Gill, Deputy Director of the Hawaii Department of Health serving as the Task Force Member. Curtis Martin of their Hazard Evaluation and Emergency Response Office will be Hawaii's representative to the Task Force Coordinating Committee. We welcome their expertise, enthusiasm, and perspective. (please see a description of Hawaii's oil spill program on page 48) With this change in our membership structure, we will officially change the organization's name to the "Pacific States/British Columbia Oil Spill Task Force."

Hawaii's membership has also prompted other changes, although not our basic mission to provide a forum for cooperation and collaboration that enhances the effectiveness of our member agencies in preventing, preparing for, and responding to marine oil spills. We have updated the 1989 Memorandum of Cooperation and expect it to be signed by Governor Knowles of Alaska, Premier Campbell of British Columbia, Governor Locke of Washington, Governor Kitzhaber of Oregon, Governor Davis of California, and Governor Cayetano of Hawaii by the date of our 2001 Annual Meeting. Our current Strategic Plan has also been revised to include a focus on Natural Resource Damage Assessment issues, at the request of the Hawaii Environmental Health Administration. This revised Strategic Plan will be formally adopted by the new membership at the 2001 Annual Meeting, and will continue to guide Task Force activities through 2004.

Hawaii's decision underscores the value which the Oil Spill Task Force provides in acknowledging and focusing state and provincial interests in oil spill policy. We highlighted those interests in a letter of welcome to Norman Mineta, newly appointed US Secretary of Transportation. We stressed the need for greater scrutiny of the oil spill risks associated with non-tank vessels, the towing industry, and pipelines. We recommended a number of improvements in the US Marine Transportation System

including maintenance of vital spill response and salvage infrastructures. We also recommended that the Office of Pipeline Safety and the US Coast Guard "acknowledge states as partners in the federal system of environmental protection, not just another set of stakeholders on the same par as the regulated sector." The States/BC Oil Spill Task Force was also invited to submit comments to the International Commission on Shipping regarding issues associated with substandard shipping. Copies of these letters and comments, as well as comments on the US Coast Guard's environmental agenda for the next decade, are available on the Task Force web site.

By providing a state/provincial forum, we have facilitated a strong working partnership with the US Coast Guard Pacific Area as well as with the Canadian Coast Guard, especially through the West Coast Offshore Vessel Traffic Risk Management Project. The diverse members of this Project Workgroup have worked together very effectively, devising an outstanding model for evaluating the risk of vessel drift groundings along the West Coast. Although the hardest work probably lies ahead - reaching agreement on recommendations on how we could reduce that risk - the data and risk assessment infrastructure has been built, and could be a model for other coasts. The US Coast Guard Pacific Area has been a remarkable partner in this process, providing countless hours of staff support. The Canadian Coast Guard has also been a very active participant and information broker. Please reference the project update on pages 6-15.

We appreciated the opportunity to meet with Captain Dave Westerholm from the Office of Response at US Coast Guard headquarters. He was gracious enough to attend the Winter meeting of the Task Force's Coordinating Committee, where he briefed us on a range of topics of common interest to both the states and the Coast Guard. We hope to continue that level of interface in coming years, with the Office of Response, the National Strike Force Coordination Center, and the new Pacific Area Marine Safety staff.

Our member agencies have also accomplished important milestones this past year. For example, the Washington Department of Ecology completed an intense partnership effort with the Coast Guard and area stakeholders to reduce oil spill risks in Puget Sound. They also worked with the Washington Governor Gary Locke to provide funding for a dedicated rescue tug at Neah Bay, and negotiated a landmark Memorandum of Agreement with the US Coast Guard, District 13, which focuses on spill prevention partnerships. The Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation completed work with a stakeholder task force that resulted in passage of landmark legislation that not only requires non-tank vessels to provide oil spill contingency plans, but also the Alaskan railroads. With this Alaskan bill, the entire West Coast of the US and Canada now has oil spill contingency plan requirements for non-tank vessels.

The following pages provide more details on the activities and accomplishments of both the Task Force and our member agencies over the past year. As you review this material, remember that it is unique. Nowhere else in the US or Canada will you find this type of regional coordination on oil spill issues, so nowhere else can you find such a compact overview of regional oil spill policy and program activities.

As Woody Allen is rumored to have said, "On one hand we have confusion and chaos, on the other, ignorance and apathy. Let's hope we can make the right choice." As far as I'm concerned, they are the same choice and we chose neither. I am quite certain that ignorance and apathy would ultimately lead to an oil spill, and then we'd be struggling to avoid confusion and chaos! That's why we stay vigilant and adaptive, seeking new partnerships in our effort to improve oil spill prevention, preparedness, and response across the Pacific Ocean. We thank you for your interest and support.

Sincerely,

Jean R. Cameron

Jean R. Cameron
Executive Coordinator



Oil Spill Task Force Activities and Accomplishments

❑ *Spill Prevention Projects:*

WEST COAST OFFSHORE VESSEL TRAFFIC RISK MANAGEMENT

When they signed a resolution on vessel routing in 1996, Task Force Members emphasized their concerns regarding oil spill risks associated with groundings and collisions from vessel traffic off the West Coast. In response to these concerns, our West Coast Offshore Vessel Traffic Risk Management (WCOVTRM) project is intended to produce traffic management recommendations that will improve the margin of safety for our sensitive coastal resources.

The WCOVTRM Project Workgroup includes representatives from our member agencies as well as key US and Canadian federal agencies, environmental and citizen groups, oil and shipping industry organizations, and ports. A total of 40 members and alternates are assigned to this project. The Workgroup has been co-chaired by Rick Holly of the California Office of Spill Prevention and Response and CAPT Frank Whipple of the US Coast Guard Pacific Area Command since it was formed in 1999. Over the 2000-2001 work-year, the Project Workgroup met in Long Beach, Portland, and Seattle in addition to meeting via several conference calls.

At their first meeting in 1999 the WCOVTRM Workgroup agreed to the following project goal statement: To develop an offshore vessel traffic scheme for the West Coast that will prevent environmental damage. The Workgroup agreed that the geographic range of the project would be from Cook Inlet to San Diego. This area of focus is offshore only and will "connect" with Traffic Separation schemes, but will not directly address them, since that work is being done in more local forums. In addition, vessel traffic management issues for the Inside Passage of British Columbia and Alaska are not within the purview of this project.

The Workgroup agreed that the following types of vessels should fall within the scope of the project:

1. Tank Ships Loaded with Petroleum and/or Hazardous Material
2. Tank Barges Loaded with Petroleum and/or Hazardous Material
3. Other Vessels, including:
   - Passenger and Dry Cargo Vessels 300 Gross Tons and Larger
   - Fishing Vessels 300 Gross Tons and Larger in Transit and Not Fishing
   - LNG/LPG Tank Ships

- Tank Ships Not Loaded with Petroleum or Hazardous Material (tank vessels can also carry tallow, molasses, and grain, for instance)
- Tank Ships in Ballast

The Workgroup collected data on the volume of traffic represented by these vessel types arriving at each major West Coast port between June 30, 1998 and July 1, 1999. Concurrently, the Workgroup also collected information from vessel masters on the routes used by coastal traffic. Put together, this allowed them to estimate both the location and volume of coastwise vessel traffic.

The data indicate that there were 19,161 vessel arrivals at West Coast ports during the period from 1July 1998 to 30 June 1999. Approximately 20% of these transits were tank ships and barges. The majority of the remainder are large commercial vessels (LCVs) such as container ships and bulk product carriers; 89% were arrivals at the major ports of Prince William Sound, the Juan de Fuca region, the Columbia River, San Francisco Bay, and Los Angeles/Long Beach (LA/LB).

Approximately 31% of the vessel arrivals were Trans-Pacific, meaning from Hawaii, Asia, Oceania, Europe through the Suez Canal, or the Middle East; such transits do not generally travel along the coast. After also deducting for 5% for which no information was available on the last port of call, the Workgroup estimates 66%, or 12,646 vessel arrivals in West Coast ports over the one year study period were coastwise transits. The Workgroup prepared a detailed graphic analysis of these vessel transits, by both vessel type and arrival port. This traffic volume data also allowed them to estimate the following traffic volume (for the study period) by coastal section:

- Alaska Coastline to British Columbia: 2,211 annual transits
- British Columbia coastline between Alaska and Juan de Fuca: 2,527 annual transits
- Along the coast between Juan de Fuca to Grays Harbor: 4,221 annual transits
- Between Grays Harbor to the Columbia River: 4,188 annual transits
- Between Columbia River to Coos Bay: 3,694 annual transits
- Between Coos Bay to Humboldt Bay: 3,658 annual transits
- Between Humboldt Bay to San Francisco Bay: 3,668 annual transits
- Between San Francisco Bay to Los Angeles/Long Beach: 4,604 annual transits
- Between Los Angeles/Long Beach to San Diego: 2,615 annual transits

Scientists at the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration's Hazardous Materials Response Division at Sand Point, Washington provided the WCOVTRM Workgroup with worst-case storm event drift scenarios. These scenarios combine information on vessel drift rates with the worst case storm event wind data from five West Coast locations: Middleton Island in the Gulf of Alaska, North of Vancouver Island, the mouth of the Columbia River, off of San Francisco, and off of Point Arguello in Southern California. Generally, vessels drift at a rate of two to ten percent of wind speed as a function vessel type. The Workgroup also considered the effect of ocean currents on drift patterns.

The Workgroup defined assist vessels as those capable of stopping the drift of a disabled vessel; obviously this is a function of both vessel and assist vessel type and size as well as weather conditions. They inventoried ocean-going tugs on the West Coast, and estimated their response times from their home ports. Over 180 ocean-going tugs were inventoried from Alaska to California; approximate 75 of these were judged able to assist during severe weather conditions as described by NOAA. This information, overlaid on the drift rate scenarios, allowed the Workgroup to establish tug assist response times for the entire coast. This tug response time analysis was specifically requested by the Task Force, and was done by Co-Chair Rick Holly and Randy Imai of OSPR.

Considering the time necessary for an ocean-going tug to be staffed and reach the ocean buoy of its home port, and estimating a 10 knot speed of advance overall, tug response times were calculated for both worst-case and average drift rates. These preliminary analyses indicated that, during worst case storm events, tugs would probably not be able to reach vessels traveling coastwise within an area ranging from 36 to 216 miles offshore; the closest number is between Coos Bay and Astoria, the furthest off the Queen Charlotte Islands of British Columbia. Under average wind conditions, this "higher risk zone" ranged from 18 to 60 miles offshore. *Please note that these are preliminary estimates which are under review; they are provided here for the purpose of illustration only.*

Nationwide casualty data indicate that one in every 100 vessels entering US ports reports a steering or propulsion failure; more such failures are estimated to be occurring, but not reported. Available casualty data collected for this project indicate that there were over 800 marine casualties involving vessels 300 gross tons or larger reported along the West Coast of North America between 1992 - 1999. Ninety-six of these casualties fall within the scope of this project as "offshore" (3-200 nm) casualties which had a potential for a significant oil spill. These casualties ranged from mechanical failures to collisions or groundings — basically,

any incident that may have caused an oil spill of 1000 gallons or more. To identify any trends in these casualties, this analysis covers a wider time period (eight years) than the one-year period used for the vessel traffic volume data. Criteria for considering which incidents had the potential of an oil spill were:



a. Loss of vessel control within 5nm of shoal water. Based on a moderate current of 1 to 2 knots, a vessel has significant potential of running aground within a couple of hours of the casualty, since most casualties require two or more hours to affect repairs;
b. Casualty entries were scrutinized to ensure that they were truly "offshore." If they occurred inside bays, straits, inlets, or near harbor entrances, the data were excluded, since this project focuses on transit-routing, not port entries, anchoring difficulties, or narrow channel issues; and
c. Any structural damage in the area of oil tanks was an indicator of a potential spill. Should the damage not have been identified, the oil discharge may have been significant.

Looking at the data overall, a heavy concentration of reported casualty positions near major ports can be discerned as one trend. This may be due to higher traffic density in these areas as well as to the fact that ships conduct their status review of steering and propulsion systems 12 hours prior to entering US waters, and thus the incidents are reported/monitored more closely (loss of steering was the most common type of equipment failure).

Cracks/fractures in the tank vessel cargo tanks were the most common type of structural failure. Structural stress for the TAPS trade tankers is to be expected since they routinely transit through the harsh environments of Gulf of Alaska. Moreover, TAPS tankers are subject to very stringent inspection and reporting standards, which may skew the reported vessel casualties to include a high number of tanker incidents. Such incident frequency should decrease as new double-hull replacements come on line for the existing TAPS tankers. The other clear trend which can be drawn from this data is that cargo/freight-ships had the highest number of incidents, but this vessel type also represents the greatest number of offshore transits.

It should be noted that only US flag ships are required to report casualties outside of US territorial waters (12 miles); this is also true of Canadian flag ships. As a result, there may have actually been more loss of power or steering casualties which occurred within the US and Canadian Exclusive Economic Zones involving foreign flag vessels, but which were not captured in the casualties analyzed above. There is no worldwide

vessel casualty database available. One way to evaluate the risk posed by vessels flying flags other than those of the US or Canada is to review information in the US Coast Guard's 1999 Port State Control Report. The Report notes that "While the total number of vessels visiting US ports increased, the number of detained ships reached the lowest level since 1994. Of the 50,539 port calls made by 7880 individual vessels from 97 different flag States, 12,448 exams were conducted and 257 vessels were detained." Of the 257 detentions, 61 were at West Coast ports. The Port State Control Report concludes that the quality of shipping is improving, noting that "The number of detentions has decreased, class society performance has improved, and the International Safety management Code has been implemented in Phase 1 vessels with very few problems."

Overall, with the limited amount of information recorded in the available databases, the WCOVTRM Workgroup is hesitant to state unilaterally that any trends can be discerned. Nevertheless, it is clear that incidents involving mechanical and equipment failures do occur off the West Coast with enough regularity to justify our concern that such incidents could result in drift groundings and the release of oil and other hazardous materials into the environment.

It is generally accepted that risk is a function of probability times consequence. No matter how much we endeavor to define the probability of risk, including an evaluation of past casualty data, probability is likely to meet high consequence where a coastal oil spill is concerned. With this in mind, the Workgroup also collected data on environmental sensitivity along the West Coast, as well as the economic and social consequences of an oil spill. Although some West Coast areas have achieved national protection status in both the US and Canada, the US Coast Guard study Evaluation of Oil Tanker Routing per Section 4111(b)(7) of OPA 90, published in 1995, stated that:

1) The shoreline is not the only sensitive marine resource area threatened by potential future oil tanker spills; waters several miles offshore are also sensitive.
2) The 10% most sensitive offshore marine resources are located within discrete areas along the Pacific coast, and not all are enclosed within the boundaries of existing national marine sanctuaries (emphasis added).
3) The 10% most sensitive offshore marine resources are located in areas often impossible to avoid while making port calls.
4) The 20% (including the 10%) most sensitive offshore marine resources merge into a nearly continuous band along the entire Pacific coast (except the waters immediately offshore of Los Angeles/Long Beach) from Canada to Mexico.

5) The 30% (including the 20%) most sensitive offshore marine resources form a continuous band along the entire coast, including the approach waters of Los Angeles/Long Beach.
6) Vessels calling at the largest deep water ports from offshore routes must transit the most sensitive offshore marine resource areas.



A similar study of sensitive offshore resources off the Alaska and British Columbia coasts was conducted by the same consultants who produced the US Coast Guard report cited above (Marine Bioregions: Gulf of Alaska and British Columbia, prepared by R. Glenn Ford and Jennifer Caylor Ward for the World Wildlife Fund, September 1998). They determined that a concentration of seabird, fishery, and marine mammal distributions can likewise be found along the entire Gulf of Alaska and British Columbia coastlines. It should also be noted that the USCG study was done in 1993 before a number of salmon populations on the mainland coasts were listed as threatened and endangered species; thus, from a 2001 perspective, that study actually understates the risk.

As stated in the USCG Oil Tanker Routing report cited above, "shoreline resources were not addressed in this study; however for the purposes of trajectory modeling, the entire shoreline of islands and mainland should be considered of high sensitivity to oil spills." While this statement was addressing only the Pacific Coast south from Canada to Mexico, it would be safe to extend that statement to cover the Pacific Coasts of both Alaska and British Columbia. There are no significant sections of shoreline of the West Coast which do not involve either sensitive bird, plant, estuarine, or mammal habitat, or beaches and towns dependent upon tourism, or port entry areas economically sensitive to the need to keep maritime traffic moving.

Although response and cleanup efforts are limited in their efficacy (mechanical recovery rates seldom exceed 20%) the costs of such efforts can be quite high. According to a study done by DF Dickins Associates for the North Puget Sound Long-term Oil Spill Risk Management Panel in February, 2000, costs per gallon of US spills reviewed in the study ranged from a low of $119 to a high of $1,486. Since a responsible party is required by US law to pay natural resource damage costs and claims for economic losses associated with the spill, such costs are included in these figures in addition to actual response costs. Although neither the Province of British Columbia or the Canadian federal government have Natural Resource Damage Assessment policies or processes, Dickins' analysis indicates that total costs per gallon of selected worldwide incidents average $253 (US).



Existing protection measures on the West Coast, such as vessel exclusion zones, protected areas, routing measures, and reporting/monitoring schemes were categorized by the WCOVTRM Project Workgroup. In addition, they reviewed future projections of traffic volume as well as changes in technology and regulations. For instance, the US Coast Guard predicts that the amount of cargo entering US ports will triple in the next twenty years; a similar expansion may be expected for the Port of Vancouver, especially as the Pacific Rim economies rebound. On the other hand, reduced resource extraction activities in British Columbia may reduce the number of tug transits in that area.

In addition, the advent of international requirements that vessels carry Automatic Identification System (AIS) devices will allow vessel traffic services in the major ports to track and advise offshore traffic, while "maritime domain awareness" and security issues are prompting increasing scrutiny of vessel traffic by both the US and Canadian Coast Guards. From a ship design perspective, vessels are being built on a larger scale and with more advanced technology. This could have the result of increasing risk if fuel tanks are larger on cargo/passenger vessels AND the crew becomes over-reliant on new technology and less able to navigate without it. New tanker designs, on the other hand, include both double hulls and redundant operating systems and are considered safer.

The Workgroup also noted that regulatory requirements adopted by the states of Washington, Oregon, and California are serving as "de facto" routing measures by forcing coastal transits to go at least 50 miles offshore to conduct ballast water exchange. The State of California has adopted requirements that tankers demonstrate contracts with salvors who can provide rescue assistance; California will extend these salvage requirements to non-tank vessels in 2002, whereas the proposed US federal rules apply to tankers only. Other states will consider whether to adopt similar standards until the US federal regulations are in place (at least three years from now).

The WCOVTRM Project Workgroup then applied the information and data they collected in designing a Risk Assessment Model; this effort was led by USCG CDR William Uberti and LT Patricia Springer. The Workgroup agreed to use nine risk factors:

1. Volume of oil and vessel design;
2. Drift rate of a vessel;
3. Collision hazard and areas causing re-routing;
4. Distances offshore;
5. Weather/seasons;
6. Tug availability at 10 knots speed of advance;

7. Coastal route traffic density;
8. Historic casualty rates by vessel type; and
9. Environmental sensitivity.
   (Please note that the tug availability analysis described earlier incorporated factors 2, 4, 5, and 6.)

Each factor was assigned values from one to ten, with credits added for some factors where compliance with new design features or existing management efforts actually reduces risk. Subcommittees of the Project Workgroup met in Alaska, British Columbia, Washington/Oregon, and California and developed vessel casualty scenarios for each area based upon actual incidents or scenarios considered either worst-case or most probable. These were scored by the Workgroup; the resulting point spread was a low of 20 to a high of 69, which was then divided evenly to define the following lower, average, and higher risk categories: Higher risks: 53-69; Average risks: 37-52; and Lower risks: 20-36. The range of scenarios by jurisdiction is as follows:

AREA	NO. OF SCENARIOS	RISKS		
		HIGHER	AVERAGE	LOWER
Alaska	11	2	8	1
British Columbia	10	4	4	2
Washington & Oregon	16	12	4	0
California	15	6	8	1
TOTAL	**52**	**24**	**24**	**4**

While these scenarios were illustrative, they were limited by the subjectivity of their design to relatively few locations. So CDR Uberti and LT Springer, working with the jurisdictional subcommittees, plotted these scenarios along the coast and then extrapolated them to location intervals ranging from less than 12 nautical miles (nm) to 100 nm offshore. This was done for each jurisdiction, thus deriving maps of higher and average risk zones coastwise. While these zones were similar to the higher risk zones outlined in the tug response time analysis, they were not exactly the same, due to the effect of additional factors.

At their most recent meeting in April 2001, CDR Uberti led the Workgroup in a review of the risk factors which contributed to the Higher Risk Scenario scores. All the factors contributed, but ranked from higher to lower by the number of times they did so, the risk factors were: weather, environmental sensitivity, distance offshore, collision hazard, traffic density, historic casualty rates by vessel types, drift rate, vessel design, and tug availability. Reviewing those factors subject to change, i.e., likely to be mitigated by actions which the Workgroup might recommend, the

group chose to focus on the following risk factors as "Areas for Further Analysis": distance offshore, higher collision hazards, tug availability, and historic casualty factors. Subcommittees were formed to address each of these risk factors and report back to the full Project Workgroup with recommendations. Certain guidelines were agreed to for this next phase:

- The Subcommittees will consider all options or recommendations.
- Discussion and analysis will include exploring human factors, existing measures, future projections, and data collection needs as appropriate.
- The Subcommittees will utilize outside expertise where necessary, such as actual ship masters and/or VTS operators with current experience to assist in the evaluation of needs.
- The Subcommittees will stay focused on the "higher risk" areas identified.
- The Workgroup and Subcommittees will use the following criteria in reviewing potential recommendations:
  - It is supported by the data in the study.
  - It is realistic, meaning capable of being implemented with available technology and expertise within a reasonable timeframe.
  - It would be effective, meaning providing real protection to the environment, not just the appearance of protection.
  - It would be economically feasible, meaning capable of being implemented without imposing unreasonable cost increase on vessel owner/operators, their customers, or ports.
  - It would be flexible, meaning allowing for improvements and changes in technology and policies.
- The Workgroup and Subcommittees will meet as necessary and use electronic and telephonic means whenever possible.
- Near the end of this process, an effort will be made to present the preliminary findings and recommendations of the Workgroup to the interested public. Where appropriate, this will be done through Harbor Safety Committees, the Canadian Marine Advisory Council in BC, and the RCACs in Alaska. If the Task Force member agencies feel that other outreach forums are appropriate in their jurisdictions, they may sponsor additional meetings.

As the WCOVTRM Workgroup enters this final phase of the project, the Task Force would like to thank Rick Holly and CAPT Whipple for their dedicated and capable leadership throughout this first phase. Since CAPT Whipple retired from the Coast Guard in May, we anticipate that CDR Uberti will serve as interim co-chair until CAPT Glenn Anderson has assumed his duties with the Pacific Area Marine Safety Office. We also acknowledge the hard work of the subcommittee chairs: Stan Norman of

the Washington Department of Ecology; Sven Ekloff of US Navy Region NW; Jerry McMahon of the American Waterways Operators Pacific Region; CDR Jim Morris, NOAA Hazmat, and CDR Uberti and LT Springer of the US Coast Guard.

SPILL INCIDENT AND CAUSAL DATABASE DEVELOPMENT

The database management and development project was picked up by Jack Barfield of the Washington Department of Ecology this past year. Jack worked with the Coordinating Committee at their Fall meeting to further define the type of data they wanted from the database. He also worked closely with contact persons from each member agency to facilitate transfer of their calendar year 2000 data to the Task Force database. Unfortunately, the other participating agencies all experienced problems, since their databases are not compatible with the Task Force program and therefore require time-consuming manual information transfer. Ecology will be redesigning the Task Force program to improve that compatibility and to insure that all necessary data is provided. In the meantime, information on all spills greater than 1000 gallons during 1999 and 2000 was provided by Alaska, Washington, Oregon, and California is provided in a separate document.

PREVENTION OF SMALL SPILLS

In recognition of the significant cumulative effect of small oil spills, the Task Force and its member agencies in British Columbia, Washington, Oregon, and California continue to participate in the Pacific Oil Spill Prevention Education Team (POSPET). POSPET is staffed by Eric Olsson of the Washington Sea Grant program. POSPET brings together educators, regulators, and concerned citizens in order to provide coordination for programs that target prevention of small, chronic oil spills from fishing and recreational vessels and marinas. Their collaboration enhances individual efforts and ensures a consistent message coast wide.

Examples of spill prevention outreach efforts to boaters includes efforts in California to train "dockwalkers" to provide education and advice at marinas and boat ramps. Both Washington and California emphasize outreach during safety training or boating events. They go where the boaters are with kits that include spill collars, absorbent materials, spill-reporting numbers, and advice on spill prevention. POSPET members are also coordinating an effort to prevent spills from dockside self-serve fuel pumps.

MONITORING THE DOUBLE-HALL CONVERSION OF TAPS TANKERS

Laura Stratton of the Washington Department of Ecology and Steve Provant of the Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation

coordinated over the past year to develop and maintain a matrix for the Task Force on the TAPS trade tankers. The matrix lists TAPS trade tankers by name, owner/operator, build date, hull configuration and Deadweight tonnage, conversion date, and retirement date. The retirement dates are the OPA 90 retirement or required conversion dates. We are aware that some operators plan to retire their tonnage prior to that date.

Our Task Force agencies have also identified contact persons within each spill program who regularly share information on any problem vessel, tank or non-tank, transiting among our member jurisdictions.

THE IMPLEMENTATION STATUS OF RECOMMENDATIONS TO IMPROVE THE SAFETY OF PILOTAGE

The States/British Columbia Oil Spill Task Force recognizes the key role that marine pilots play in oil spill prevention, guiding vessels to a safe harbor. Moreover, in the US, these pilots are licensed and governed by our states to operate in local waters. Beginning in 1995, we reviewed US and Canadian national studies on pilotage and noted that a specific West Coast focus was needed. So in 1996, we recruited several West Coast pilots to help us design a survey of pilot groups and governing authorities in our member jurisdictions. The survey focused on how these pilot groups are organized, how they train, bridge communications issues, and their policies to ensure accountability and professionalism. The survey results were then reviewed and discussed by an expanded Pilotage Project Workgroup that included shipping industry representatives, more West Coast pilots, and representatives from our Task Force member agencies. Stan Norman of the Washington Department of Ecology served as the Chair for this Project.

The final report from this Workgroup - with their recommendations - was released in 1997 and made available to all organizations addressed in the recommendations: pilot groups, pilot regulatory boards and commissions, and the US and Canadian Coast Guards. It has been available on our web site since 1997. The report was provided to the American Pilots Association as well as pilots from New York/New Jersey, Maryland, Louisiana, and Venice, Italy. It was recently requested by persons working to organize pilotage standards for Finland, Estonia and Russia. It was presented to meetings of the West Coast Pilots Association and the International Pilotage Conference, both in 1997, and the Clean Gulf Conference in 1998. The 1997 report and recommendations, as well as the results of this more recent survey were presented at the 2001 International Oil Spill Conference.

A 2001 survey was conducted to determine the status of implementation of the 1997 recommendations, barriers to implementation, and what recommendations or comments the West Coast pilotage community might wish to provide five years later. Questionnaires were sent to twenty-three pilot groups and governing boards on the West Coast, as well as to the Canadian and US Coast Guards. A total of nine responses were received, representing a 36% return rate. By jurisdiction, the return rate for Alaska was 40% (2/5), 33% (1/3) for British Columbia, 0% for Washington, 50% (2/4) for Oregon, and 25% (2/8) for California. Both the Canadian and US Coast Guards also replied regarding specific recommendations directed to them.

Survey results are in a draft stage as this annual report is compiled, but a final report will be available at the 2001 Annual Meeting and on the Task Force website or by request thereafter. Judging from preliminary results, implementation of the Task Force's 1997 recommendations has been impressive in most responding jurisdictions. What's more, innovative programs have been undertaken in a few areas. The Alaska Division of Occupational Licensing worked closely with Alaskan pilots to develop a performance monitoring program in conjunction with simulator training. This scheme has been opposed by the West Coast and International Marine Pilots Associations, but the American Pilots Association has taken the issue under review. Also noteworthy is the fact that Jacobsen Pilot Services in Long Beach is the first pilot group in the US to become ISO 9002 certified, thus improving their professional status. And the Columbia River Bar Pilots have undertaken another first in the US: the use of helicopters to deliver their pilots to incoming vessels. This move has not been without controversy within their organization, and has not relieved them of the necessity to maintain a small pilot boat. However, they do feel that it has enhanced navigation safety because they can get to incoming ships during a greater range of sea-state conditions, and can access vessels further from Astoria. Earlier arrival on board provides their pilots with more time for the master/pilot information exchange.

Where overall implementation is weakest - i.e., in performance monitoring, adoption of work/rest standards, or the membership of governing boards and agencies - the primary barriers appear to be either natural resistance to change or fear of either fault-finding or higher costs. Pilots should acknowledge that, as beneficiaries of regulated monopolies, they need to take all necessary steps to ensure their professionalism and accountability. In turn, the shipping industry needs to acknowledge the costs which go with additional investments in training, performance monitoring, and adequate work/rest periods, are far lower than the costs of spill response or salvage. Finally, pilotage governing authorities should

acknowledge that they are the watchdogs of these monopolies, and become proactive in setting high standards, encouraging public involvement, and advocating for adequate resources to meet their statutory mandates.

A copy of the final report on the results of this 2001 survey are available upon request or at the Task Force web site.

SPILL PREVENTION TOPICS OF CONCERN

Throughout the year the Coordinating Committee has monitored and shared information on the following oil spill prevention "topics of concern":

- Cruise ship operations with regard to spills and other water pollution impacts;
- Substandard shipping operating on the West Coast and associated risks of oil and hazardous material spills;
- Oil spill prevention research and development;
- Salvage capacity on the West Coast, including emergency towing and lightering; and
- Pipeline spill prevention.

The Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation provided leadership with regard to cruise ship pollution issues, since they have been proactive in holding that industry accountable and monitoring discharges in Alaskan waters (visit the ADEC website through the Task Force website). British Columbia and California have long hosted cruise lines; with cruise ship operations initiated in Seattle last year, more small cruise ships working the Columbia River out of Portland and Astoria, and greatly increased cruise ship activities in Hawaii, this is now a topic of concern in all our member jurisdictions.

On the topic of substandard shipping, the Task Force was invited to submit comments to the International Commission on Shipping's (ICONS) inquiry into ship safety. The Commission invited submissions beginning in March of 2000, and held both public and private meetings with more than 400 persons in Asian, North America, South Africa, and Europe through November of 2000. Transport Canada arranged for the States/British Columbia Oil Spill Task Force to participate, and our comments were formally submitted in conjunction with a Commission meeting in Vancouver, BC.

Our statement to ICONS focused on the need for the International Maritime Organization and the International Association of Classification Societies to initiate coordinated campaigns against substandard shipping,

campaigns that include both aggressive enforcement and tougher standards. We recommended mechanisms for flag and port state accountability, as well as improvements to current international standards, including incentives for early replacement of single-hull tankers with double-hull tankers; similar incentives for replacement of aging non-tank vessels (cargo, passenger, and fishing vessels); construction standards that would reduce the marine pollution risks associated with both tank and non-tank vessels; pollution response training for crews; addressing problems associated with over-reliance on technology and ever-larger ships; and the need for improvements in rescue and salvage capability. Copies of our statement are available on our website.

Of the remaining issues listed above, all were discussed at the quarterly Coordinating Committee meetings when new information was available. Please refer to the activity reports from Washington and Alaska with regard to pipeline issues, Washington and California with regard to salvage issues, and Alaska and California regarding spill prevention research. It should be noted that 2000 was the last year that the Task Force will produce our summation report on member agency R&D activities, since funding for such work has been significantly reduced over the years and few new projects are foreseen at this time. We will, however, continue to follow oil spill R&D activities by federal agencies and the private sector with interest.

❑ *Spill Preparedness and Response Projects:*

COMPARE OIL SPILL FINANCIAL RESPONSIBILITY REQUIREMENTS

As re-emphasized in the US v. Locke Supreme Court decision in last year, states are not preempted by federal authority from requiring that vessels operating in state waters be liable for all costs and damages associated with an oil spill. Among the West Coast states, California has set the highest financial responsibility requirements; tankers and large tank barges operating in California waters must provide a certificate of financial responsibility for up to $1 billion. Non-tank vessels must meet a $300 million level. Other West Coast states currently have lower financial responsibility requirements, but are considering raising them. The State of Oregon's experience with the New Carissa grounding and oil spill has led to consideration of establishing a higher level than its current amount, which is equivalent to that established in the US Oil Pollution Act of 1990. Washington's non-tank financial responsibility level is also equivalent to OPA '90, and was also under reconsideration during the 2001 legislative session, as was its financial responsibility requirement for tank vessels. To facilitate and support this effort, the Task Force has provided a forum for

compilation of all financial responsibility requirements in its member jurisdictions. The final matrix will be available by July 2001, either from the Task Force website or the Task Force office.

THE INTEGRATED VESSEL RESPONSE PLAN GUIDELINES

In 1998 the Task Force completed a cooperative project with the US Coast Guard and industry stakeholders that resulted in approval of a voluntary Integrated Vessel Response Plan (IVRP) format. This format allows correlation of West Coast state planning requirements as well as the Shipboard Oil Pollution Emergency Plan (SOPEP) required by the Canadian Coast Guard with the US Coast Guard vessel planning requirements.

The Task Force Members signed a formal agreement in 1998 reflecting their willingness to accept vessel response plans submitted in the IVRP format. They also agreed to communicate any new or revised contingency planning regulations to the Task Force Executive Coordinator for updates to the format guidance matrix. In addition, the Canadian Ministry of Transport determined that the Integrated Vessel Response Plan format will be acceptable to meet their vessel planning standards, since it includes the SOPEP format from Marpol. A formal endorsement from the US Coast Guard is also in place.

The integrated format guidance matrix is available to planholders on the Task Force website, and is kept current with any changes in member agency contingency planning regulations.

1-800-OILS-911

The Task Force maintains this toll-free spill reporting number in California, Oregon, Washington, and British Columbia. Although it is available for anyone to use, information regarding the number is targeted at recreational boaters and fishermen through the same outreach used by POSPET (see page 15 above). The number automatically reaches the 24-hour emergency reporting number in each of these four jurisdictions as a function of the location from which the call originates. For example, a call made from anywhere in Washington will automatically reach the Washington emergency reporting number. Usage analysis for August 2000 through April of 2001 shows that the OILS-911 number has been used 157 times over that period. The breakdown shows that 15 of those calls were made in British Columbia, 17 in Washington, 4 in Oregon, and 121 in California.

SPILL PREPAREDNESS/RESPONSE TOPICS OF CONCERN

Throughout the year the Coordinating Committee has monitored and shared information on the following oil spill preparedness/response "topics of concern":

- Non-Tank vessel contingency planning requirements at the state and federal level;
- Unannounced drill programs;
- Federal limits of liability;
- Access to the US federal Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund;
- Abandoned vessels;
- Hazardous material spill contingency planning;
- Response technologies;
- Spill response research and development ; and
- Spill response training standards and programs.

As noted earlier in this Annual Report, the 2001 Alaska Legislature passed a bill requiring non-tank vessel contingency planning. The Task Force has provided a forum for information sharing among its member agencies in support of this effort; proposed revisions to existing regulations in Washington and California have also been discussed. In addition, the Executive Coordinator presented a paper at the 2001 International Oil Spill Conference in support of national regulations requiring oil spill contingency plans of non-tank vessels.

The California Office of Spill Prevention and Response has developed an active unannounced drill program over this past year, and provided the Coordinating Committee with a briefing and ongoing information regarding the status of this program. Committee members continue to track developments on this topic, as well as revisions to the US Coast Guard's OSRO and PREP programs. When available, information is shared on all other the topics of concern listed above.

Of the remaining issues listed above, all were discussed at the quarterly Coordinating Committee meetings when new information was available.

❑ ***Communications Projects:***

We continue our focus on public outreach and public involvement as well as improving communications among our member agencies. With regard to our public outreach efforts, the Executive Coordinator maintains a mailing list of over 800 interested persons in the US, Canada, and abroad. Not only do these persons receive a Quarterly Report to Stakeholders which covers Task Force activities, but they also receive notices of the annual meetings and the Legacy Awards program with a request for



nominations. A review of our communications initiatives and events follows:

THE 2000 TASK FORCE ANNUAL MEETING

Our 2000 Annual Meeting was held in Monterey, California on July 25th and was attended by 60 people representing state, provincial, and federal agencies, consultants, representatives from citizen advisory committees, industry, and pilot and response organizations. The meeting's theme was "Building a Balance."

US Coast Guard Vice Admiral Ray Riutta, Commander, Pacific Area, gave the keynote address. He outlined maritime commerce issues on the West Coast and referenced the evolution of the Coast Guard's role in marine safety, noting that "the fundamental issue in the US Coast Guard's marine safety mission is trust," referring to the trust placed in the Coast Guard by the public to protect its resources and by the industry to exercise the public trust reasonably. He also acknowledged the importance of strong partnerships and stakeholder involvement in achieving success. VADM Riutta closed by challenging the Task Force Members to be aware of the key elements essential to success: leadership, innovation, and cooperation. He explained that vision is the essence of leadership, innovation means thinking outside of the box, and cooperation involves all players.

The program also included presentation of the Legacy 2000 awards and several Task Force Certificates of Appreciation (see details below), updates on our member agencies' activities, and two panel presentations. The first panel focused on outcomes of the North Puget Sound Long-term Risk Management Project and was moderated by Stan Norman of the Washington Department of Ecology. Panelists included Doug Scott for People for Puget Sound, Cliff Benson of Westwood Shipping Lines, Jerry McMahon of the American Waterways Operators, and Kurt Beckett representing Congressman Norm Dicks. Yvonne Addassi of the California Office of Spill Prevention and Response (OSPR) moderated a panel on Response Resource Planning. Panelists included Jonathan Bishop of Save Our Shores, Bud Leland of OSPR, Ellen Faurot-Daniels of the California Coastal Commission, and CDR Paul Jewell of the US Coast Guard's Pacific Strike Force. Following the panel presentations, a lively public comment period involved the audience, the panelists, and the Task Force Members.

LEGACY AWARDS

The Legacy 2000 Awards Program provides the States/British Columbia Oil Spill Task Force with an opportunity to recognize and support



implementation of model spill prevention, preparedness, and response programs. Award categories include industry, non-profit or public agency organizations, individuals, and team efforts. The Task Force gives annual Legacy Awards in these categories for projects, accomplishments, or leadership that demonstrates innovation, management commitment, and improvements in oil spill prevention, preparedness, or response resulting in enhanced environmental protection. Efforts to promote partnerships and involve the public are also weighed. Organizations or individuals nominated for the Legacy Award must be located or primarily operating in the Task Force jurisdictions of Alaska, British Columbia, Washington, Oregon, and California. Organizations or individuals representing a regulated industry must demonstrate a satisfactory history of compliance with state, provincial, and federal oil spill regulations. The following Legacy 2000 Awards were given at the Annual Meeting on July 25th, 2000:

The Task Force presented its 1999 Legacy Awards for Oil Spill Prevention to the following seven winners:

- The Community Impacts Planning Team of the Prince William Sound Regional Citizens' Advisory Council: The Prince William Sound Regional Citizens Advisory Council's Community Impacts Planning Project Team, guided by their Scientific Advisory Committee, consists of technical experts and representatives of communities impacted by the Exxon Valdez oil spill. Last year the Team published "Coping with Technological Disasters, A User Friendly Guidebook." This work represented years of socioeconomic research and public outreach in efforts to understand and mitigate the mental health impacts of an oil spill. In a major oil spill, a community is quickly consumed by oil spill activities, and long after the response is over, the community's residents are still battling the social disruptions caused by the spill. Technological disasters have been shown to cause unusually high levels of tension, conflict, ongoing litigation and chronic psychological stress. Mitigation of such impacts is not addressed in typical government and industry contingency plans, but this Guidebook contains information to help communities and individuals understand what a technological disaster is, how it differs from a natural disaster, and what to expect both during and in the years following the disaster. Information, resources, and proven programs are presented in the guidebook for use by local governments, civic groups, oil spill responders, mental health organizations, and individuals. Since its release, the Guidebook has been requested by communities, organizations, and companies throughout Alaska, the United States and internationally, and has been praised by community leaders, mental

health professionals, and responders as an excellent reference and resource. Ms. Lynda Hyde accepted the award on behalf of the PWS RCAC.

- Captain Hubert "Glen" Glenzer: CAPT Glenzer has served as President of the Board of Directors for the Cook Inlet Regional Citizens' Advisory Council (CIRCAC) since its inception in 1990. CAPT Glenzer has been a willing and effective ambassador for CIRCAC, and has tirelessly carried the message that prevention needs to be the primary focus of oil spill planning. Respected as a veteran of the US Navy, a past official with the Alaska Department of Transportation, and a past Director of the Port of Anchorage, Captain Glenzer built an effective link between the citizens of Anchorage and the oil companies that do business in Cook Inlet. For ten years he has put forth an extraordinary amount of time and effort towards the cause of environmentally safe marine transportation and oil facility operations in Cook Inlet. He oversaw the development of CIRCAC's Long Range Plan and was a key proponent of CIRCAC's Safety of Navigation in Cook Inlet Forum, which drew participants from all segments of the marine transportation industry, as well as from environmental groups, government agencies, and native villages. Captain Glenzer has also supported development of Geographic Response Strategies for Cook Inlet. His unflagging commitment to the goals of CIRCAC has resulted in an oil spill prevention and response system for Cook Inlet that is much improved since 1990.
- Martyn Green, President and General Manager, Burrard Clean Operations: Martyn Green is held in high esteem by people in the response industry in both the US and Canada. Martyn has been a true leader, statesman, and diplomat since he first started in spill response. He learned about oil spill response and cleanup working in the field when the cooperatives were small organizations compared with today. Martyn was one of the original members of the group of oil spill cleanup organization managers know today as the Association of Petroleum Industry Cooperative Managers (APICOM); his insight, dedication, resourcefulness and leadership helped APICOM to become an internationally recognized organization. Martyn has always been a person to lend assistance, support, advice, or the resources of his organization to help others; he brought Burrard Clean resources into the US on numerous occasions, including the ARCO Anchorage tanker spill in 1985, the barge Nestucca in 1988, Exxon Valdez in 1989, and the Tenyo Maru in 1991. As OPA 90 was implemented, Martyn helped resolve issues regarding Transboundary waters, and joined the Washington State Maritime Cooperative in providing coverage for

US or Canadian nontank vessels in the Straits of Juan de Fuca. He works regularly with British Columbia and Canadian spill program officials to improve spill preparedness and response programs that protect BC's marine waters. Martyn has provided both Canada and the US with a wealth of experience, knowledge, and assistance over the last 25 years.

- The International Bird Rescue and Research Center: The International Bird Rescue and Research Center (IBRRC) has been in existence for approximately 20 years; during that time, IBRRC staff have responded to essentially every major West Cost spill involving wildlife, as well as spills in the Pacific Island, Gulf of Mexico, Australia, South Africa, and Europe. Most recently, IBRRC Director Jay Holcomb has helped organize wildlife rescue and rehabilitation during the Treasure spill off of South Africa, and the Ericka spill off the coast of France. IBRRC has worked continually to improve the care that oiled birds receive; they have published widely, have hosted several "Effects of Oil on Wildlife" meetings, and supported research efforts. Because they are recognized as having contributed significantly to oil spill wildlife rehabilitation, IBRRC staff assisted in the development of two reports published by the Task Force in 1998 which cover recommended protocols for the care of oil-affected birds and marine mammals. Dan Kane, IBRRC Board Chairman, accepted the award.
- Roland E. Miller, President, Clean Sound Cooperative, Incorporated: Roland Miller is recognized for his leadership, dedication, cooperation, and tireless efforts to improve spill response readiness and training in the Pacific Northwest. During his decade of service at the Clean Sound Cooperative he has been largely responsible for the significant increase, improvement, and strategic deployment of spill response equipment throughout Puget Sound. During implementation of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990, he was instrumental in developing a comprehensive training program for Clean Sound employees that has become an industry model. Roland's greatest contributions to the response community, however, involve his on-going work with the Northwest Area Committee. Over the years, he has been actively involved in countless committees, workgroups, exercises and projects, many of which he chaired, co-chaired, or steered to success. Examples include the development and testing of geographic response plans; implementation of alternative response technologies (in-situ burning and dispersants); development of an annual 40-hour "hands-on" spill-response training course for government and industry; and the establishment of a workgroup to coordinate drill and exercise scheduling and evaluation. In addition, Roland worked

with another Legacy 2000 Award winner, Martyn Green, to establish a mutual aid agreement between the Washington and British Columbia response cooperatives, addressing numerous US/Canada Transboundary issues in the process. A great deal of the government/industry teamwork enjoyed today in the Pacific Northwest can be directly attributed to Roland's cooperative attitude, leadership, experience and effort.

- The Oiled Wildlife Care Network: California's Oiled Wildlife Care Network (OWCN) is administered by the UC Davis School of Veterinary Medicine's Wildlife Health Center, notably Dr. Jonna Mazet, Program Director, Wildlife Veterinarians Kirsten Gilardi, Scott Newman, Mike Ziccardi, and Center Manager, Kathy Collins. Twenty other agencies, institutions, and organizations are part of the OWCN, including three universities, leading aquaria and ocean parks, marine mammal stranding groups, wildlife rehabilitators, and industry members who utilize OWCN's services. The OWCN is the central focus of California's readiness program for oiled wildlife response, and has dealt with essentially every spill in California involving wildlife since 1995. The OWCN provides equipment and supplies to its participants and trains hundreds of volunteers annually. Most impressively, the OWCN has built several new state-of-the-art wildlife care facilities that, when not being used for oil spill response, provide classrooms for education or space for wildlife rehabilitation and research. The Marine Wildlife Care facility at Humboldt State University has proven its worth in two major spills. An OWCN facility recently opened in San Diego and facilities in Los Angeles and Cordelia will open this fall. The OWCN has developed and administers a major competitive grants program to study the effects of oil on wildlife and improvements in oiled wildlife care. This work has resulted in more effective care techniques and documented survival rates of oiled wildlife that far exceeds previous results. The OWCN receives $1.3 million a year from the interest on California's response trust fund, and state officials consider it to be an excellent example of a public/private partnership for environmental stewardship. Dr. Mazet and her team accepted the award for the Oiled Wildlife Care Network.
- A posthumous award honoring William C. Park III: Bill Park began his environmental protection career by forming the first Coast Guard Strike Team in 1972. During other Coast Guard assignments, Bill served as Chief of the Marine Environmental Protection Branch and Commanding Officer, Vessel Traffic Service, both in Puget Sound. After his Coast Guard career, Bill joined Mobil Oil Corporation where he was responsible for providing oil spill response training, contingency plan review and equipment

recommendations for Mobil facilities worldwide. Bill Park was one of the founders of the Petroleum Industry Response Organization, the predecessor of the Marine Spill Response Corporation (MSRC). His vision, industry experience, and technical skill were instrumental in the establishment, guidance, and development of MSRC. In September of 1990 MSRC named Bill Park the first General Manager for the Northwest Region (Washington and Oregon). Subsequently, he became Vice President of the Western Region in September of 1996. In that role, Bill participated in all facets of response planning and implementing oil spill prevention and preparedness in the states of Washington, Oregon and California. He retired from MSRC in May of 1998 and on October 22, 1998, the OSRV Washington Responder was re-named the "W. C. PARK RESPONDER" in recognition of his many years of service to the oil spill response industry and to the protection of the marine environment. Bill Park passed away on March 9, 1999. Bill's son Tim accepted the award on his behalf, accompanied by Joe Gross of MSRC.

- Totem Ocean Trailer Express: The Task Force is giving a Legacy 2000 Award to Totem Ocean Trailer Express (TOTE) in recognition of their commitment to construct two new ORCA class cargo vessels that incorporate marine pollution prevention design features. TOTE operates up to three Ro/Ro (roll on, roll off) vessels as week, year-round, in the Tacoma to Anchorage trade. Their vessels and crews must typically endure sever winter storms, ice-choked channels and harbors, and a shallow draft inlet. The nature of their liner cargo requires them to accomplish their transits at speeds significantly above most vessel operators. TOTE's decision to build two new vessels with greater environmental features and responsiveness standards, none of which are required by regulations, is consistent with the spirit of the Legacy 2000 Award. The ORCA Class features include:
  - Double hull fuel tanks that are not adjacent to the vessel's hull;
  - A ballast water management system that precludes the need to exchange ballast water;
  - Fuel efficient engines which exceed California's air quality standards and which are constructed to allow for the later installation of scrubbers – now under development – that will eliminate all emissions;
  - A state-of-the-art sewage treatment system;
  - All solid waste is compacted and disposed shore-side; and
  - Redundancy in the critical operating systems, including engines, generators, motors, rudders, propellers, and radar systems;

  The two new vessels are scheduled for delivery in 2002. Honoring

the ORCA Class design emphasizes the Task Force's focus on reducing oil spills and marine pollution from non-tank vessels. Mr. Bob Magee accepted the award for Totem Ocean Trailer Express.

- The US Coast Guard Marine Safety Office San Francisco: The Marine Safety Office (MSO) San Francisco has been proactive in implementing its environmental protection mandate. In October, 1998 the MSO worked with the State of California's Office of Spill Prevention and Response (OSPR) to respond to an oil spill first sighted a along the southern approach to San Francisco Bay. They quickly mounted a response that limited shoreline impacts and reduced wildlife casualties. The MSO's aggressive investigation into the source of the spill identified the culprit as the T/S Command. After locating the Command at sea, the MSO coordinated a boarding off Mexico, which marked the first time that a ship has ever been intercepted on the high seas for suspicion of pollution charges. An MSO-led investigative team met the ship in Panama and confirmed suspicions that the Command was the source of the spill. The MSO's evidence enabled US attorneys to charge the vessel master, chief engineer, owner and operator with felony charges of negligent discharge of oil, violating the Endangered Species and National Marine Sanctuaries Acts and making false statements. The charged parties pleaded guilty and paid $9.4 million in criminal and civil fines. In March of 1999, the MSO responded when the M/V Hollandic Confidence, a dry bulk vessel carrying a cargo of prilled sulfur, lost its forward hatch cover in stormy weather so that the hold flooded and the bow was submerged. After taking steps to safeguard the crew, the MSO worked with OSPR and vessel representatives to help the stricken vessel safely enter San Francisco Bay, avoiding any loss of the 200,000 gallons of fuel oil on board. The MSO has also been a strong supporter of the San Francisco Bay Harbor Safety Committee and has an outstanding track record of coordination with both OSPR and the Marine Facility Division of California State Lands. CDR Peter Neffenger accepted the award on behalf of the San Francisco Marine Safety Office.

CERTIFICATES OF APPRECIATION

The Task Force also presented the following Certificates of Appreciation at their 2000 Annual Meeting:

- Rob Floerke: In appreciation for his efforts as Chairman of the Oil Spill Field Operations Guide Update Project, sponsored by the Task Force from December 1998 to June 2000. His experience in the development of the original oil spill FOG, his expertise in the use of Incident Command System principles in oil spill response, and his enabling leadership all contributed to the success of this update and

revision process. He participated and provided leadership for the work of three subcommittees as well as the project workgroup, gently guiding more than forty-five participants to final consensus on revisions to both the national oil spill FOG and oil spill ICS forms. His efforts will be reflected in improved oil spill response nationwide.

- LCDR Brian Tetreault: In appreciation for his outstanding efforts in support of the West Coast Offshore Vessel Traffic Risk Management Project. While assigned to the 11th US Coast Guard District, Brian not only helped the States/BC Oil Spill Task Force and the USCG Pacific Area Command to initiate and implement this project, but he enthusiastically and energetically contributed in several areas of project research and application as well. These included development of a comprehensive overview of existing West Coast routing and monitoring measures, integration of coastal vessel traffic data, analysis of offshore casualty data, and application of assist vessel data to response time projections for major West Coast ports. Brian's experience with the Monterey Bay National Marine Sanctuary vessel routing project as well as his extensive knowledge of vessel traffic control issues were important contributions during the first phase of this project.
- Michele Brown: In appreciation for her efforts in support of the States/British Columbia Oil Spill Task Force over the last five years; her vision and leadership have helped define and realize the mission of the Task Force to enhance oil spill prevention, preparedness, and response efforts on the West Coast of North America. Michele's leadership in improving the spill prevention and response system in Alaska has provided innovative models for all Task Force jurisdictions. These innovations include a new fleet of powerful tugs equipped with the best available technology to escort super-tankers and respond to emergencies; advancements in training for ships' officers and marine pilots; improved programs for corrosion prevention in pipelines and leak detection in storage tanks; and developing inclusive response agreements with local communities. Michele accomplished these and other improvements by integrating scientific research with regulatory flexibility and stakeholder involvement to achieve results that have placed Alaska in an international leadership role for oil spill prevention and response.
- Langdon Marsh: In appreciation for his efforts in support of the States/British Columbia Oil Spill Task Force over the last five years; his vision and leadership have helped define and realize the mission of the Task Force to enhance oil spill prevention, preparedness, and response efforts on the West Coast of North America. Lang's

guidance has been important to all Task Force projects, but of particular note were his efforts on behalf of administrative support for the Task Force, his vision for the future of the Task Force as evidenced in the development of our 1999-2004 Strategic Plan, and his sharing of the "lessons learned" from the New Carissa spill event with other Task Force jurisdictions.

- Stan Norman: In appreciation for his efforts in support of the States/British Columbia Oil Spill Task Force over the last five years; his vision and leadership have helped define and realize the mission of the Task Force to enhance oil spill prevention, preparedness, and response efforts on the West Coast. Stan's maritime experience and his commitment to spill prevention helped provide leadership for our efforts to improve the safety of marine pilotage, to develop a coastal database and cadre of trained investigators capable of providing information on the causes of oil spills, and to evaluate the oil spill risks posed by coastal vessel traffic. Stan have been committed to a vision of the Oil Spill Task Force as both a forum for collaboration and a force for change. As a Coordinating Committee member he has promptly and cheerfully provided guidance, feedback, and assistance whenever needed. Both his support and vision have proven invaluable to the progress of the Task Force.

TASK FORCE WEB SITE

The British Columbia Ministry of Environment, Lands, and Parks continues to maintain a site on the World Wide Web for the Task Force. From the home page you can access the following information:

- Overview of Task Force
- Map of area of interest
- List of Task Force Members and Coordinating Committee
- Current Strategic Plan
- Current Annual Workplan
- Current Annual Report
- Recent Correspondence and Comments
- Cooperative Agreements
- Resolutions
- Project Reports
- Summary Notes of the most recent Annual and Coordinating Committee Meetings
- Connections to Internet sites for Task Force Member and Federal Agencies
- Upcoming event information

Visit our site on the World Wide Web at:
www.env.gov.bc.ca/eeeb/taskforc/tfhome.htm

OTHER TASK FORCE OUTREACH ACTIVITIES

- Pursuant to our focus on submitting Task Force consensus comments on federal initiatives which would impact our programs or policies, the Executive Coordinator tracks rulemaking activities and notifies member agencies of opportunities for comment on relevant proposals. Comments were submitted over the last year on the US Coast Guard's Environmental Agenda and proposed rules for reporting marine casualties.
- The Task Force responds to information requests from students, regulators, journalists, professionals, and concerned citizens worldwide. From August of 2000 through May of 2001, the Task Force has responded to information requests from the US, Canada, Finland, Australia, Indonesia, and New Zealand.
- Jean Cameron represents the Task Force on the Pacific Region Quality Steering Committee of the American Waterways Operators and the US Coast Guard. This team is focused on improving safety in barge and towing operations on the West Coast. Stan Norman of the Washington Department of Ecology serves as the Task Force's alternate.
- Jean Cameron also serves as a member of the US Coast Guard's Navigation Safety Advisory Council (NAVSAC), where she works with representatives of the maritime community to prevent oil spills by promoting navigation safety through applications and revisions to both the inland and international "rules of the road," advice on implementation of the Coast Guard's Prevention Through People program, and review of safety issues associated with developments in maritime and navigation technology.
- The Coordinating Committee of the Task Force held its quarterly meetings in Olympia, San Diego, and Juneau over this past work year. These meetings provide opportunities for information exchange and decisions on implementation of our annual workplan. The Task Force Coordinating Committee was authorized by the Members to meet as a working subcommittee this year, rather than in public session as in past years. Working in a more informal setting has facilitated more spontaneous and lively exchanges among Committee members.
- The Task Force member agencies routinely exchange information on their initiatives and activities. In addition, the Task Force office maintains a directory of member agency staff that includes information on their program areas and ICS specialties, thus facilitating both information exchange between agencies as well as expertise exchange during spill responses.
- Jean Cameron presented two papers at the 2001 International Oil Spill Conference in Tampa, Florida in late March. One paper covered

the Task Force's 1997 recommendations to improve the safety of pilotage and preliminary results of the 2001 survey. The other focused on the need for a nationwide contingency plan requirement for non-tank vessels.

- Jean also participated in two drill events this year. One was sponsored by Chevron in Honolulu, and the other by Burrard Clean Operations in Victoria, British Columbia.
- In an ongoing effort to improve internal communications among member agencies, the 2000-2001 Annual Workplan took a slightly different look as we added contact information for agency staff assigned to each project, and clearly outlined the workload associated with each project.

For additional information on any of the Task Force projects or efforts described in this report, please contact Jean Cameron, Executive Coordinator, at (503) 229-5720 or write to the States/British Columbia Oil Spill Task Force at 811 SW 6th Ave., Portland, Oregon, 97204-1390 (FAX: (503) 229-6954).

Internet address: cameron.jean@deq.state.or.us
Visit our site on the World Wide Web at:
www.env.gov.bc.ca/eeeb/taskforc/tfhome.htm

Task Force Member Agency Activities and Accomplishments

In addition to their dedication of staff and resources to Oil Spill Task Force projects, our member agencies have been involved in a wide range of initiatives in their own jurisdictions, as outlined below:

ALASKA:

The Division of Spill Prevention and Response, Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation (ADEC)

❑ ADEC received 1843 oil spills, 41 brine spills, and 238 reports of hazardous substance spills in calendar year 2000. The Department conducted 305 field responses to oil spills, 2 field responses to brine spills, and 46 field responses to hazardous substance spills. The Department estimates 174,531 gallons of oil, 45,655 gallons of brine and 60,366 gallons of hazardous substances were spilled in 2000.

❑ ADEC initiated responses to several significant incidents, including six North Slope petroleum facility spills, four Cook Inlet petroleum facility spills, three Red Dog mine facility spills, and three spills from the Williams Refinery. The Department reviewed and analyzed the spill history at Williams Refinery, identified improvements needed for oil and glycol response, and is working with Williams to improve their procedures. Bunker oil spills from abandoned facilities at Cordova and New Port Walter near Sitka and from the vessel Windray in Western Alaska required Department spill response action. One Alaska Railroad derailment near Wasilla resulted in a gasoline spill to wetlands.

❑ ADEC provided oversight for the Royal Caribbean Cruise Line Settlement. The Department reviewed and approved the spill response equipment totaling $2.1 million. The equipment is being ordered and will be staged in several communities in Southeast Alaska for response to all spills. The department is also participating in a working group to use settlement monies to develop geographic response strategies for Southeast Alaska.

❑ Based on the results of the September 1999 North Slope broken ice field tests, industry was required to conduct additional broken ice field testing in the spring and fall of 2000. These included testing of barge-based oil recovery systems, recovered oil transport and decanting tactics. Based on



results from the spring and fall testing, industry will continue to operate under spring and fall drilling restrictions. ADEC continues to work with industry on the North Slope, Kenai Peninsula and Cook Inlet in developing and testing pipeline leak detection systems to meet the requirements of State oil pollution prevention regulations.

❑ ADEC continues to work with BP and Phillips to implement the Charter Agreement for the Alaska North Slope. This agreement was entered into with the State of Alaska as a part of the BP-ARCO merger. The Charter's environmental commitments include a pledge by industry to spend over $15 million to clean up and improve response on Alaska's North Slope over the next ten years. ADEC has compiled a report of accomplishments covering the first full year of implementation of the agreement.

❑ ADEC's implementation of new legislation to require proof of financial responsibility for certain non-tank vessels and railroad operations that carry or transport substantial amounts of fuel continues. There are approximately 1000 nontank vessels and one railroad operation (the Alaska Railroad) subject to these regulations. New legislation requiring these nontank vessels and the railroad to develop contingency plans was signed into law on April 6, 2001. The Department is embarking on a regulations-development process this year, with the goal of having the regulations in place before the end of FY 2002. The newly-regulated operators will have six months after the promulgation of the regulations to submit contingency plans to the Department for review and approval.

❑ ADEC continues to participate in spill drills to test industry and government response effectiveness. In the spring and fall of 2000, broken ice response deployment exercises on the North Slope were conducted to fulfill a condition of approval for the Phillips and BP/Amoco North Slope contingency plans. In addition to ADEC, barge-based recovery system deployment and testing was observed by representatives of the U.S. Minerals Management Service, the Alaska Department of Natural Resources, the U.S. Coast Guard, and the North Slope Borough. ADEC will require further technical work and exercises to improve the effectiveness of broken ice response tactics and pipeline leak detection measures.

❑ ADEC continues to work with local communities around the state to provide for cooperative spill response and address local preparedness needs. There are now thirty-three Community Spill Response Agreements in place between ADEC and Alaskan local governments. These agreements have proven to be a useful way to reimburse local governments for costs incurred from response activities undertaken at ADEC direction. Enhancements to local spill readiness and capability will

continue as needs and deficiencies are identified through the ongoing Subarea Contingency Plan development.

❑ ADEC is extending its prevention program to address home heating oil tanks. The tanks are a significant source of spills and present a major human health risk in residential areas relying on shallow groundwater as a drinking water source. ADEC has initiated a public outreach and education effort to reduce home heating oil spills. To date, a one-page prevention flyer has been distributed statewide through private fuel distributors, and the Department has completed an engineering study that focuses on the best available technology for manufacture, installation, and secondary containment. The Department plans to extend its public outreach efforts through the development and distribution of brochures and newspaper and television educational messages.

❑ ADEC is increasing its hazardous materials (hazmat) response capability and awareness. The Department has conducted hazmat awareness projects at Petersburg, Kodiak, Unalaska, King Salmon, and Bristol Bay. These projects establish and improve the defensive response capabilities for communities that face the risk of a chemical release. The projects typically include training in response to anhydrous ammonia (and if applicable, chlorine) releases; non-regulatory technical assistance visits to facilities which use anhydrous ammonia; incident command system training; and a tabletop or functional exercise. The Department has established agreements to activate the Anchorage and Fairbanks hazmat teams for Level A and Level B responses outside of their respective jurisdictions.

BRITISH COLUMBIA:

The Ministry of Environment, Lands and Parks

❑ The Ministry of Environment, Lands and Parks (BC Environment) works to protect people, property, and the environment from environmental hazards through its emergency program. This program undertakes emergency planning and coordination and uses trained Response Officers for oil and hazardous material response. The Enforcement and Emergencies Branch in Victoria undertakes environmental emergency planning. (Environmental Emergency Program's Homepage: http://www.elp.gov.bc.ca/eeeb/eephome/index.htm)

❑ On average, more than 3500 environmental emergencies are reported to the ministry annually; most are hazardous material spills and releases.

Eighteen Response Officers located in regional offices are available to respond to these spills. There is an Environmental Emergency Planner and an Emergency Operations Officer in Headquarters (Victoria) for planning and preparedness of large-scale incidents from marine, freshwater, and land based hazards.

❑ An interagency coordinating committee has been established to promote cooperation among oil spill response agencies. Membership includes BC Environment, the Environment Canada, Fisheries & Oceans Canada, Burrard Clean Operations, Ltd., and the Port of Vancouver. The Marine Spill Coordinators Committee meets regularly to exchange information and to discuss training, equipment, and response issues of mutual concern.

❑ BC Environment supports and monitors Coast Guard (both US and Canadian), shipping and oil industry initiatives towards marine oil spill prevention, preparedness and response. Issues include:

- Improving Rescue tug capability along BC's West Coast;
- Assessing shipping risk on the outer BC' coast from vessels on the great-circle route, en route to Alaska, or operating in Canada's territorial sea;
- Phasing out of single-hulled oil tankers on the Trans-Alaska Pipeline System (TAPS);
- Promoting a unified command approach in marine oil spill response among lead jurisdictions and the Responsible Party;
- Reducing chronic spills from commercial and recreational vessels, and
- Promoting compliance on waste discharges from passenger and other major vessels.

❑ BC Environment and the Land Use Coordination Office continues to maintain the Coastal Inventory and Oil Spill Response Information System for coastal protection and planning. This computer-based system utilizes satellite imagery with video and geographically linked/mapped coastal inventory data for determining shoreline sensitivity. Coastal resource and land use data have been gathered for the Strait of Georgia, Vancouver Island and Central Coast. An atlas of the west coast of Vancouver is available on CD-ROM.

❑ A BC Oiled Wildlife Rescue and Rehabilitation Organization based on the Incident Command System has been established. The non-profit organization (Oiled Wildlife Society of BC) augments the response capabilities of the SPCA by promoting awareness and training in the rehabilitation of wildlife affected by an oil spill. One of the goals of the

society is to secure funding and equipment for this purpose.

❑ An Environmental Situation Report was developed from an incident involving the M/V HANJIN ELIZABETH and M/V CARIA vessels, disabled off the west coast of Vancouver Island in mid-February, 1999.
The report is available at:
http://www.elp.gov.bc.ca/eeeb/eephome/index.htm#anchor16064

WASHINGTON:

Spill Prevention, Preparedness, and Response Program, Department of Ecology

(Please note: This report covers calendar year 2000. It does not include events and developments after January 1, 2001.)

❑ The Spills Program's efforts to prevent oil spills from vessels underwent a dramatic change in 2000. The Program had based its spill prevention work for oil tankers and tank barges on a system of operating standards, documented by required spill prevention plans. But on March 6, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that several of Washington's Best Achievable Protection (BAP) standards for tank ships were pre-empted by federal law and regulation (Intertanko vs. Locke). The ruling held that only the federal government may regulate the subject matter in the pre-empted standards. Intertanko, an association of independent tanker owners based in Norway, filed the lawsuit in July 1995, shortly after the BAP standards became mandatory for tank vessels operating in Washington.

Based on the Court's guidance provided in its decision, Ecology and the State Attorney General decided to suspend enforcement of all the BAP standards for tank vessels. The state eventually repealed the oil spill prevention plan rules for tank vessels with the intent of drafting new rules that reflect the limits imposed by the decision.

The Intertanko ruling was a landmark decision. It gave definitive guidance on areas of vessel operation and management that states may not regulate without the concurrence of the federal government, represented in this case by the U.S. Coast Guard. Washington's BAP standards pushed the envelope when they were adopted in 1994. Many of the BAP standards have now become federal and international standards because they are, in fact, appropriate standards for the safe operation of tank vessels.

The Spills Program, with the Thirteenth Coast Guard District, has begun a detailed analysis of the "gaps" between the BAP standards and the federal/international standards for tank vessels to determine precisely

what oil spill prevention measures were lost in the decision. For more information contact Stan Norman, at (360) 407-7465 (e-mail: snor461@ecy.wa.gov).

❑ In response to the Intertanko decision, in June the Spills Program launched the Voluntary Best Achievable Protection (VBAP) Program for tank vessels. Under this program, owners and operators voluntarily meet the BAP standards for tank ships and tank barges, increasing their overall level of marine safety and reducing the probability of a spill. During 2000, 50 percent of the tank ship transits in Washington waters were made by companies enrolled in this voluntary environmental protection program.

❑ The North Puget Sound Long-term Oil Spill Risk Management Panel produced its final report and recommendations in 2000. The panel included representatives of 20 groups with an interest in marine safety issues in North Puget Sound. The U.S. Department of Transportation and the State of Washington established the panel in late 1999 with the goal of developing an oil spill risk management plan for Washington's largest marine transportation corridor. The study area extended from the northern outer coast through the entrance to the Strait of Juan De Fuca and included all waters north of Port Townsend (Admiralty Inlet) through the San Juan Islands to the Canadian border.

Building primarily on existing information, the Panel completed the most comprehensive risk management planning process in recent years. The report concluded that approximately 15 billion gallons of oil moved through Puget Sound during 1999. About half consisted of crude oil being transported to Washington refineries in about 1,270 tanker transits and a large number of oil barge movements. There were also approximately 9,800 cargo and passenger vessel transits in the area, carrying considerable amounts of fuel. A recent Coast Guard study estimated that the current probability of an oil spill over 10,000 gallons in Puget Sound is one in five years, and that this probability will increase to one in 3.6 years by 2025, if new prevention measures are not established.

The Panel's report, North Puget Sound Long-term Oil Spill Risk Management Panel – Final Report and Recommendations, made 24 formal recommendations. These included improvements to vessel routing, industry "Standards of Care," improvements to vessel inspection programs, Canadian engagement, expanding the Olympic Coast National Marine Sanctuary "area-to-be-avoided," vessel traffic management, partnership mechanisms, and spill response. The Panel's work improved the dialogue and debate among community stakeholders. It strengthened the federal/state relationship with a commitment to revise the interagency

agreement between the Coast Guard and Ecology. Six other measures (including two recommendations related to vessel towing) were considered but not passed.

The process has opened a dialogue among diverse community interests that will continue to produce results far into the future. The underlying conflict on the need for the Neah Bay rescue tug, however, was not resolved.

The Coast Guard, Department of Ecology, and Puget Sound Harbor Safety Committee began moving forward on implementing the recommendations and making progress on some of the key unresolved issues. The Panel's report will also form the basis for future discussions on how to best protect our shorelines, environment, and economy from the risk of major oil spills. For more information, contact Jon Neel at (360) 407-6905 (e-mail: jnee461@ecy.wa.gov).

❑ The 1999 vessel incident rate, or the percentage of vessel transits resulting in an incident, increased slightly to 1.91 percent (107 incidents) from the 1998 rate of 1.81 percent (94 incidents). Citations issued also increased, to 155 in 1999 from 141 in 1998. These numbers may reflect the increased percentage of entering dry cargo vessels screening high or very high for potential risk. In 1999, 1,586 vessels screened at the high or very high level, compared to 1,391 vessels in 1998.

❑ During 1999, the Spills Program:

- Received 3,450 reports of spills in Washington; there were 1,515 reports of petroleum product spills, 1,136 reports of hazardous substance spills, and 799 reports of miscellaneous substances.
- Conducted 1,117 field responses. Of those field responses, 789 (70 percent) were to clandestine drug lab cleanup sites (hazardous substances).
- Participated in and evaluated 117 spill preparedness drills at regulated oil-handling facilities – 77 equipment deployment drills and 40 tabletop drills.
- Conducted 48 vessel notification drills, testing the ability of vessel crews to make the correct initial notifications in the event of a spill.
- Held four no-notice equipment deployment drills to test the initial response capabilities of contingency plan holders and their primary response contractors.
- Evaluated and re-certified the training and certification programs for five regulated oil-handling facilities, and reviewed and approved more than 30 facility operations manuals.
- Received resource damage assessment payments of more than

$455,000 in compensation for oil spills.

- Investigated the causes of 12 spills at oil-handling facilities and completed 15 full-scale investigations of vessel incidents.
- Produced Prevention Bulletins publicizing the lessons learned from a bunkering spill and a grounding, and issued Safety Advisory Bulletins about the Puget Sound Vessel Transit System and the hazards caused by special conditions along the Oregon/Washington coast.

❑ In 1999, facility and vessel contingency planning staff updated the Manual for Review of Facility and Vessel Oil Spill Contingency Plans. Late in the year they began work on revising the rules governing vessel and facility oil spill contingency plans. The goal is to improve oil spill response in Washington by creating rules that are more consistent with changes that have occurred, that are simpler by taking advantage of the planning that has been done, and that are more efficient by consolidating regulatory requirements. The revision will incorporate changes that have occurred since the rules first took effect in 1991, such as new federal regulations, the development of the Northwest Area Contingency Plan, and the establishment of Geographic Response Plans.

❑ On June 10 an Olympic Pipeline Co. underground pipe ruptured in Bellingham, dumping about 280,000 gallons of gasoline into Whatcom Creek. A spark ignited the spill, and the resulting fire burned two miles of the creek and killed two boys. A third young man was overcome by fumes and drowned. During the first days after the explosion, Spills Program staff worked on many elements of the response, including the Unified Command, which controlled all aspects of the response. After the initial emergency, Ecology's primary jobs at the site were assisting in investigating the causes of the leak, assessing the environmental damage, and devising a recovery plan, jobs that continued throughout the year. The cause of the rupture and spill is still under investigation.

❑ In 1999, Coastal Protection Fund monies bought 450 acres of intertidal land in south Fidalgo Bay near Anacortes. The Department of Natural Resources now holds title to this area of high-quality eelgrass habitat. Eelgrass habitat is vitally important to herring and other forage fish production. Much of the money for the purchase came from the damage assessment from the 1994 CROWLEY BARGE 101 oil spill off the San Juan Islands.

OREGON:



Spill and Site Assessment Program, Oregon Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ)

❑ Oregon's Task Force Member Langdon Marsh resigned as Director of the Department of Environmental Quality last Fall, and Stephanie Hallock was appointed Director by the Oregon Environmental Quality Commission on Nov 6, 2000. Previous to her appointment she was on a special one-year assignment as a water quality policy adviser for Gov. John Kitzhaber's Natural Resources Policy Group. Stephanie Hallock has been with DEQ 12 years, serving as administrator of the agency's Hazardous and Solid Waste Division, the DEQ Eastern Region and as acting administrator of the Water Quality Division. She also has served at the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's Region 9 office in San Francisco as chief of the Policy and Grants Branch, and has worked in advertising and public relations at the Hallock/Modey Agency, Portland. Stephanie Hallock has a master's degree in Public Administration and a B.A. degree in English, both from Portland State University.

❑ The Department of Environmental Quality has been working closely with the maritime shipping and petroleum industry to improve Oregon's oil spill prevention and preparedness program. This has been done through expedited contingency plan approval, a drill and exercise pilot program, and the refinement of Geographic Response Plans.

❑ House Bill 2150 (HB 2150) was introduced to the Oregon legislature this year to help further these goals. HB 2150 changes fees that provide funding for the oil spill prevention program, clarifies the role of the state on-scene coordinator, consolidates financial responsibility requirements, proposes oil spill contingency plans for inland pipelines and directs DEQ to create a work group to examine the benefits of contingency planning and other prevention ideas for inland facilities. This bill was crafted in coordination with the maritime and petroleum community and enjoys broad support in the legislature.

❑ Over 80% of the Oil Spill Prevention and Contingency Plans submitted to the Department have been approved.

❑ The Department is coordinating with interested parties to develop a dispersant use approval process. The work group is charged with developing a new decision-making process for the use of oil spill dispersant. This project requires coordination with other state agencies, coastal stakeholders, environmental groups, response organizations and

other interested parties.

❑ Drills and Exercises: The spill program has coordinated with a focus group and has designed a DEQ drill and exercise pilot program. The workgroup was made up of regulated facility and vessel plan holders, other state and local governments, oil spill response organizations and environmental groups. Results of the pilot project will be evaluated at the end of the year.

❑ Spill staff participated in "Columbia River '00." This was a National Preparedness for Response Exercise Program exercise. DEQ was represented by Mike Renz as the State On Scene Coordinator and Jack Wylie as the co-leader of the Environmental Unit in the Planning Section. Other staff participated in the design and evaluation phases. Foss Maritime participated as the industry participant and the USCG was represented by Captain James Spitzer as the FOSC.

❑ In developments regarding the M/V NEW CARISSA from January 2000 to May 2001:

- **Situation.** The stern of the New Carissa remains grounded in the surf zone on the North Spit of Coos Bay. The remaining wreck is in two sections: the engine room and holds 5 and 6. The engine room section is listing 40 degrees and tipped forward 18 degrees. The hold section is buried under sand with only the crane housing visible above water. Representatives of the ship owner continue to monitor the beach near the stern twice a week. Small numbers of tarballs (usually <20) are observed on about half of the monitoring days. On December 22 and 23, 2000 a total of 150 tarballs were observed. Samples were analyzed and found consistent with New Carissa source oil. On May 1, 2001 a total of 958 tarballs were observed. Samples were taken and analysis is underway.
- **Wreck Removal.** The Oregon Division of State Lands, acting as the lead state agency, is coordinating wreck removal planning with the vessel owner's representatives. Both seaward and land based options are being considered. The vessel owner hired a consultant, Captain J. M. Noble, BMT Murray Fenton Limited, London, England, to prepare and present a report on the condition of the wreck and removal options. Captain Noble's bottom line recommendation is: "Having reviewed the considerable documentation currently available and visited the wreck site I have no hesitation in recommending that the most responsible course of action is to do nothing more at the "NEW CARISSA" wreck site. The chance of a worker being seriously injured or killed far outweighs any benefit." Despite Captain Noble's report, an April 4, 2001 letter from Bill

Millwee, the ship owner's primary wreck removal consultant stated: "For the record, I again affirm that our objective is to remove the entire wreck of the New Carissa and that our priority considerations are safety to human life and the environment." Applications for permits to remove the New Carissa have been submitted to the US Bureau of Land Management and the US army Corps of Engineers. An environmental impact statement is being drafted.

- **Natural Resource Damage Assessment.** The Interim Preassessment Report was published March 31, 2000. The Final Report on Seabird Mortality, which completed the Preassessment reporting, was published on May 14, 2001. The trustees are reviewing restoration options and considering transition to the formal Restoration Planning phase.
- **Litigation.** On February 2, 2001 lawyers for the owner of the New Carissa filed a lawsuit against the United States. "This was done to preserve the right to claim for losses, which may be as much as $96 million.... Under U.S. law, the owners must file suit within two years of the incident.... Specifically, the complaint alleges the grounding occurred due to the negligence of employees of the U.S. Coast Guard and the National Ocean Service/National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. The U.S. Coast Guard required that the New Carissa rely on an official chart and the Coast Pilot, produced by the National Ocean service, when it anchored in the Pacific Ocean off Coos Bay, Oregon on February 3, 1999. The chart and the coast Pilot showed the location as a suitable anchorage. Neither publication warned that the anchorage is unsafe during winter months, or that dredge spoils had been deposited there, making the anchorage unsafe. Also, the U.S. Coast Guard observed the New Carissa at the anchorage on February 4, and did not warn of any danger." (From a Statement released by The Rockey Company, February 2, 2001)

❑ DEQ received 1,420 spill notifications from the Oregon Emergency Management Division in 2000.

- One hundred forty six of the spills in 2000 were petroleum products greater than 42 gallons.
- 12 petroleum spills were over 1000 gallons
- 11 spills were to navigable waters of the state
- 5 spills were from regulated facilities or covered vessels
- The largest spill was 20,000 gallons of diesel from a pipeline.

❑ Unified Command was set up five times during the last year:

- 15 Mile Creek A spill of the herbicide GOAL occurred on August 22nd at The Dalles when a truck traveling on I-84 wrecked and

burned on the bridge over the creek. The initial impact of the spill of about 2600 gallons of the material killed everything in the creek up to the Columbia River. One of the types of native wildlife killed by the hundreds was the ammocete, (the larva of the lamprey eel), which has cultural significance to the Tribal fisherman. The response to this spill included Rohm & Haas, (the manufacturer of GOAL), Prime Trucking (owners of the truck), Washington Department of Ecology and several state and federal agencies. EPA was the federal on-scene coordinator. Helpful input was provided by local farmers and the tribal representatives of Warm Springs and Umatilla Tribes.

- Yaquina River This spill occurred on January 27th when a fatal accident occurred on Hwy 20 outside of Toledo on the Oregon coast. The result was the discharge of approximately 5,800 gallons of No. 6 oil fuel in an area directly adjacent to the Yaquina River. A significant amount of the oil entered the river. Incident response team members include the U.S. EPA, U.S. Coast Guard, DEQ, Blue Line Transportation (responsible party, Portland), ODFW, Oregon Department of Transportation, U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service, and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. DEQ sent two State On Scene Coordinators to the spill site as well as other support positions. The river was boomed by 9:30 AM the first morning. Oil was vacuumed off the surface of the water and absorbents were used. Sinking oil and tarballs were soon recognized as an unusual problem. Some of the submerged tarballs were cleaned up using snare booms and shrimp nets. Initial observations were that both techniques were effective.
- Asty Palea On April 8th, a tanker was unloading liquid urea fertilizer at the dock at Port of Portland Terminal T-4 (berth 408) when 3 or 4 leaks in the hull were discovered. The ship had just taken on bunkers prior to unloading the fertilizer. Around midnight the crew noticed a crack in the starboard side and a sheen on the water. The crew began to de-ballast the ship, but that caused the cracks to widen. About 50-100 gallons of bunker oil had spilled into the Willamette River.
- Kalama Mystery spill On March 5th, the USCG, Washington Department of Ecology and DEQ responded to a mystery spill in the Columbia River. It is estimated that 500 gallons of bunker-like fuel was spilled. The response lasted approximately 3 days. Although wildlife impacts were minimal, the integration of the wildlife unit into the operations section was considered a success. Due to the low flow levels in the Columbia River, booming strategies were modified. The USCG and Washington Department of Ecology are conducting an investigation to determine the responsible party.

- Certified Coatings spill On Oct. 6, a barge used as a platform to assist workers painting the Interstate-5 Bridge over the Columbia River started taking on water. The barge eventually tipped to one side, spilling a variety of heavy equipment and sixty-seven 55 gallon barrels of spent sandblasting material (fine steel grit and lead-based paint) into the river. Also, a 5,000 gallon capacity fuel tank containing about 2,000 gallons of diesel fuel fell into the river. Major equipment that fell off the barge included a grit blasting unit containing two diesel engines and two 15-gallon fuel tanks, and a vacuum including a 50-gallon fuel tank containing about 25 gallons of diesel fuel. The initial response included DEQ, Oregon Department of Transportation, US Coast Guard, Washington Department of Ecology, Certified Coatings, Foss Environmental, and Advanced American Diving Inc. The barge was righted and the 5,000 gallon diesel tank was secured. One diesel generator was lost, containing 50 gallons of fuel, as was the sandblasting machine. Crews dismantled the big piece of equipment in the river - the grit sand-blasting unit called "Barney". Fuel tanks and engine system apparatus from Barney were removed and moved away from the site to alleviate concerns about possible petroleum leakage from this equipment. In all, an estimated 155 gallons of petroleum products were lost to the environment from the fuel tanks and engine compartments of the various pieces of equipment and storage tanks. All of the 67 drums have been recovered. Most of the drums sustained minor damage (dented, punctured, or seal broken) and retained all or most of their contents. Actual release of waste from the barrels appeared to be minimal; only a few drums lost most or all of their contents. After a detailed inventory of recovered drums was completed, it is estimated that approximately 242 gallons of abrasive waste was lost. The effects of the release continue to be investigated through DEQ's Site Assessment Program. Initial samples collected from the release area indicate that lead concentrations exceed what would be considered background for the area and conservative screening criteria. Currently, ODOT and Certified Coatings of California are preparing a work plan to complete the evaluation of the relative magnitude and extent of the release, and to assess the mobility and availability of the contaminants to aquatic receptors. This information will be used to determine whether additional cleanup is needed to protect the environment. The challenges faced by the responders included the difficulty of working in an area adjacent to a shipping lane, working underwater in an area of moderate to swift currents and very low visibility (generally 1 to 2 feet).

CALIFORNIA:

The Office of Spill Prevention and Response of the California Department of Fish and Game

❑ OSPR, which is housed within the Department Fish and Game, is the lead State agency charged with oil spill prevention and response within California's marine environment. The Lempert-Keene-Seastrand Oil Spill Prevention and Response Act of 1990 established OSPR and provides the OSPR Administrator with substantial authority to direct spill response, cleanup, and natural resource damage assessment activities.

❑ California Oiled Wildlife Care Network: California has established a coast-wide network of oiled wildlife rehabilitation facilities to support the California Oiled Wildlife Care Network. In the last year, new facilities were opened at San Pedro and Cordelia. These joined facilities already established at Humboldt Bay, Santa Cruz and San Diego to provide a comprehensive statewide oiled wildlife rehabilitation capability.

❑ Oil Spill Contingency Plans: The shipping and oil industries have submitted 1,327 contingency plans. Of these 258 are facility plans, and 1,069 are vessel plans, covering 1,258 tank vessels and 4,263 nontank vessels.

❑ Maritime partnerships: In the last year, the OSPR completed a series of five of partnership projects to enhance spill prevention through navigational safety. In Humboldt Bay, the OSPR entered into a partnership with the Humboldt Bay Harbor District to construct new range markers. In San Francisco Bay, the OSPR approached the San Francisco Marine Exchange to create a local partnership to create an automatic identification system (AIS) and acquire four electronic navigation units for demonstration by the pilots. In Port Hueneme, the Oxnard Harbor District, Port Hueneme Pilots, U.S. Navy and OSPR will install a current meter near the harbor entrance. In Los Angeles/Long Beach Harbor, a Physical Oceanography Real-Time System (PORTS) will serve in the harbor complex as well as a video display. In the Port of San Diego, OSPR established a partnership which developed the functional requirements for a maritime information system for San Diego Bay.

❑ Unannounced Drills: Ten unannounced drills were held during 1999-2000. OSROs voluntarily participated seven of these drills. Of the remaining three, one was held on a facility plan holder, one was part of an OSRO re-application and the OSRO refused to participate in one. On May 16 and 17, 2001, four additional unannounced drills were held on

planholders in the Los Angeles/Long Beach area. These drills were based on a document entitled "Objectives and Guidelines for Unannounced Drills with California Oil Spill Contingency Plan Holders" that OSPR published on April 25, 2001, after considering input from a wide range of interests.



- Regulations: OSPR completed an emergency regulation filing to implement the provision of SB221, further refined the COFR amount reductions to any nontank vessel carrying below a defined oil volume threshold. Los Angeles/Long Beach Tug Escort Regulation amendments became effective on October 1, 2000. These added additional requirements for "bollard-pull" testing for tugs to qualify as escort tugs for tankers and barges.

- The OSRO regulations Technical Advisory Group made significant progress to amend the OSRO Approval Program regulations to further clarify the requirements, and refine the ratings assigned. OSPR conducted a 25% "CAPS" increase review. This workgroup reviewed the mandated 25% increase to the on-water recovery volumes ("CAPS"), to determine if the increase is feasible and necessary for the best achievable protection of California marine resources. The review was finalized in January, 2001, and is waiting for review by the Office of Administrative Law. A series of industry workshops were completed to take input on proposed amendments to the bunkering and lightering regulations. These amendments are now ready for the formal regulatory process.

- In addition, OSPR worked with the LA/LB Harbor Safety Committee to draft amendments to make additions to the tug/tanker matching criteria, and to add additional requirements and clarification to the exemptions from tug escorts. The formal rule making process has begun – should finalize by the end of May. In San Francisco Bay, OSPR completed a series of workshops and initiated the formal rulemaking process that would amend the tank vessel escort regulations by clarifying pilot and Clearing House responsibilities; providing additional categories in the tug/tanker matching criteria; and allowing alternate compliance for the tug/tanker matching for short transfers.



Editor's Note: Although the Hawaii Environmental Health Administration will not be a formal member of the Task Force until August 1, 2001, we invited them to submit the following agency "profile" for your information:

HAWAII:

The Hazards Evaluation and Emergency Response Office of the Environmental Health Administration in the Hawaii Department of Health

OVERVIEW OF HEER FUNCTION AND ACTIVITIES

In general, the function of the HEER Office is to plan for and respond to hazardous substance, pollutant, contaminant and oil releases to the environment. The HEER Office evaluates actual or potential impacts such releases may have on the public, environment and natural resources and mitigates them as needed. The HEER Office is staffed with professionals able to assess chemical risks, evaluate the extent of chemical contamination, formulate response plans, oversee remediation, and actually conduct response activities. In addition, the HEER Office coordinates statewide planning activities to prepare for and respond to chemical and oil spills in the environment.

During FY 2000, the HEER Office received 567 notifications of chemical or oil spills and responded to 265 of them. This is a 7.0% increase over the 530 spill notifications reported in FY 1998. Notable among the spill responses are the following:

- DOT Harbors Pier 2 oil leak
- Tesoro oil spill at Barbers Point and cleanup on Kauai
- Paradise Queen II grounding and breakup on Kure Atoll
- Pearl City bike path pipeline leak
- Van Loi grounding and breakup on Kauai

During FY 2000, the HEER Office concentrated on improving its programs and enhancing its capacities in the following priority areas:

- Improve enforcement of Chapters 128D and 128E, HRS.
- Improve emergency response preparedness.
- Improve oversight and response to contaminated sites.
- Improve usage of the Voluntary Response Program (VRP) and Brownfields programs.
- Improve office operations.
- Develop a Hawaii Chemical Accident Release Prevention Program.

During FY 2000, the HEER Office implemented the following legislation passed by the 1998 Legislature and received approval from the 2000 Legislature to raise the budget ceiling of the Environmental Response Revolving Fund for a number of program needs, including:

- On July 2, 1998, Act 141 SLH 1998 was approved. It increased the maximum balance of the Environmental Response Revolving Fund from $7,000,000 to $20,000,000.
- Act 116 SLH 1998 (budget bill) approved the purchase of an Airborne Dispersant Delivery System (ADDS) costing $1,230,700. This new oil spill response capability was ordered in FY 2000 and will be implemented in FY 2000. It will allow the State and the Coast Guard to utilize chemical dispersant to fight offshore oil spills and to keep the oil from reaching Hawaii's beaches.

During FY 2000, the HEER Office will continue to build its capacity to order, enforce and oversee cleanups of contaminated sites and recover costs wherever possible. In addition, it will encourage greater utilization of incentive programs such as the VRP and Brownfields programs to return contaminated properties to productive economic use. Finally, the HEER Office will work to develop and implement a comprehensive Hawaii Chemical Accident Release Prevention Program.

The HEER Office operates under various environmental authorities. The primary state enabling legislation is Chapter 128D, HRS, "Environmental Response Law" or commonly referred to as Hawaii's Environmental Response Law (HERL) and Chapter 128E, HRS, "Hawaii Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act" (HEPCRA). Chapter 128D, HRS, is modeled after the federal Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA) and Chapter 128E, HRS, is modeled after the federal Emergency Planning and Community Right-To-Know Act (EPCRA). Unlike CERCLA, HERL defines hazardous substances to include oil. Due to this fact, the HEER Office becomes involved in oil spill planning, preparedness and response activities under the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA 90). The following is a list of the legal authorities under which the HEER Office operates:

Legal Authorities

State Laws/Rules (Hawaii Revised Statutes - HRS)

- Chapter 128D, HRS, "Hawaii's Environmental Response Law" (HERL); Title 11, Chapter 451, Hawaii Administrative Rules (HAR), "State Contingency Plan."
- Chapter 128E, HRS, "Hawaii Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act" (HEPCRA).



- Chapter 321, HRS, "Department of Health", Title 11, Chapter 5, HAR, "Environmentally-Related Illness and Injury Reporting"

Federal Laws

- Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA), 40 CFR, Part 300, "National Contingency Plan."
- CERCLA, Title III, "Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act," 40 CFR, Part 302, "National Contingency Plan."
- The Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA 90), 40 CFR, Part 300, "National Contingency Plan."

Program Mission and Objectives

Mission:

To protect human health, public welfare and the environment, and to provide state leadership, support and partnership in preventing, planning for, responding to, eliminating, and enforcing environmental laws related to releases or threats of releases of hazardous substances, pollutants or contaminants including oil.

Specific program actions are:

1. Prepare for and respond in a timely and effective manner to releases of hazardous substances and oil into the environment.
2. Prepare and respond to all media related (air, land and water) releases during non-routine state working hours (off-hours).
3. Locate, investigate, and assist in the cleanup of lands with prior releases of hazardous substances, pollutants or contaminants.
4. Prevent harmful releases of oil and hazardous substances into the environment.
5. Evaluate the risks associated with releases of chemicals into the environment and other environmental risks to public health and the ecosystem.

Objectives:

Objective A: Environmental Release Response:

A-1: Improve the preparedness of federal, state and local entities to respond to releases of petroleum and hazardous materials into the environment utilizing risk-based management principles and effective partnerships.

A-2: Integrate the Department of Health's response and cleanup programs utilizing risk-based management principles and effective partnerships.

A-3: Enhance and improve capabilities to identify and assess hazardous substance and petroleum-contaminated sites.

A-4: Enhance and improve capabilities to clean up hazardous and petroleum waste sites.

Objective B: Prevention of Environmental Contamination

B-1: Implement an oil spill prevention program in Hawaii.

B-2: Implement a Pipeline Safety Program.

B-3: Implement a Clean Air Act (CAA) Section 112(r) Risk Management Program.

B-4: Implement a HEPCRA Inspection Program.

Objective C: Statewide Risk Assessment Support

C-1: Maintain an ongoing core of qualified environmental technical experts.

KEY TASK FORCE PERSONNEL



Task Force Members

MICHELE BROWN, COMMISSIONER (1995-2001)
Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation

TOM FITZSIMMONS, DIRECTOR (1996-2001)
Washington Department of Ecology

HARLAN HENDERSON, ADMINISTRATOR (2001)
Office of Spill Prevention and Response,
California Department of Fish and Game

STEPHANIE HALLOCK, DIRECTOR (2000-2001)
Oregon Department of Environmental Quality

DEREK THOMPSON, DEPUTY MINISTER (1999-2000)
British Columbia Ministry of Water, Air, and Land Protection

GARY GILL, (INCOMING 2001)
Hawaii Deputy Director for Environmental Health

Coordinating Committee Members:

LARRY DIETRICK (1999-2001)
Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation

HEATHER TAYLOR (2000-2001)
British Columbia Ministry of Water, Air, and Land Protection

STAN NORMAN (1995-2001)
Washington Department of Ecology

BUD LELAND (2000-2001)
Office of Spill Prevention and Response,
California Department of Fish and Game

MIKE ZOLLITSCH (1997-2001)
Oregon Department of Environmental Quality

CURTIS MARTIN (INCOMING 2001)
Hawaii Hazards Evaluation and Emergency Response Office
of the Environmental Health Administration

Executive Coordinator:

JEAN CAMERON
States/British Columbia Oil Spill Task Force

DOCUMENTS AVAILABLE FROM TASK FORCE and MEMBER AGENCIES

Available from:

The Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation
410 Willoughby Ave., Suite 105
Juneau, AK 99801-1795

- *Quarterly Spill Report Summary* - Published and distributed within 30 days of the end of each quarter.
- *Annual Spill Report Summary* - Published and distributed within 30 days of end of fiscal year.
- *Callout Directory* - Published quarterly or as needed.
- *Response Fund Annual Report* - Compiled each January for the Legislature.
- *Equipment Management Manual* - Reviewed and updated annually; published and distributed in September.
- *Equipment Inventory Reports* - Updated continuously; distributed to SOSCs semi-annually or as needed.
- *Safety Manual* - Reviewed and updated annually; includes former Training Manual and Product Site-Safety Plans.
- *Response Team Rosters* - Continuously updated.
- *Unified Plan* - Reviewed annually and amended as necessary.
- *Sub-Area Plans* - Reviewed annually and amended as necessary.
- *Drill Schedule* - Prepared on a fiscal year basis and updated as needed.
- *Type 1 Area Response Plans* - Under development.
- *PERP "Lessons Learned" Reports* - Prepared after major spill responses and exercises.
- *PERP "Lessons Learned" Summary* - Annual report of lessons learned from drills and spills.
- *PERP Fiscal Year Report* - Prepared annually.
- *Community Right-to-Know (CRTK) Reports* - Annual report, included in quarterly spill summaries.
- *Hazards Analyses* - Updated as needed.
- *Term Contractor Guidelines* - Updated as needed.
- *Prevention and Emergency Response Program Brochure*
- *Community Spill Response Brochure*
- *Statewide Hazardous Materials Response Brochure*
- *Emergency Response Communications Brochure*
- *Nearshore Demonstration Project Brochure*
- *Statewide Equipment Packages Brochure*
- *Applied Research and Development Project Brochure*
- *Technical Review of Leak Detection Technologies for ASTs and Crude Oil Transmission Pipelines* (CD-ROM)

Available from:

The British Columbia Ministry of Water, Aair, and Land Protection, 4th Floor
P.O. Box 9376
Stn Prov Govt
Victoria, BC, V8W 9M1, CANADA

- BC Coastal Marine Facility and Operating Standards Manual (11/91)
- Guidelines for Industry Emergency Response Contingency Plans (3/92)
- Coastal Resources Oil Spill Response Atlas: Southwest Coast of Vancouver Island (8/90)
- Coastal Resources Oil Spill Response Atlas: Southern Strait of Georgia(11/93)
- Oiled Marine Shoreline Cleanup Training Course (5/95)
- Basic Marine Oil Spill Safety Training Course (5/95)
- The Double Hull Issue and Oil spill Risk on the Pacific West Coast (7/95)
- Benefit-Cost Analysis of Expediting the Schedule for Double-Hulling Oil Tankers and Barges Operating in and near British Columbia Waters (9/95)
- Benefit-Cost Analysis of Establishing a Dedicated Rescue/Salvage Tug to Serve Canada's Southern West Coast (9/95)
- Financial Preparedness for a Major Marine Oil Spill in British Columbia (9/95)

For more information about documents or British Columbia's Environmental Emergency Program, access the following WEB site on the Internet: : http://www.env.gov.bc.ca/eeeb/eephome/eephome.html

Available from:

The Office of Spill Prevention and Response
California Department Fish and Game
P. O. Box 944209
Sacramento, CA 94244-2090

- Compendium of California Oil Spill Statutes (1997)

Documents are also available from the OSPR website at http://www.dfg.ca.gov/Ospr/

Available from:

The Spills and Site Assessment Section
Environmental Cleanup Division
Oregon Department of Environmental Quality
811 SW Sixth Avenue
Portland, OR 97204-1390

- The Pacific Northwest Area Plan and Geographic Response Plans for Oregon (updated on an ongoing basis. For the latest GRPs go to http://www.uscg.mil/d13/m/nwac/nwac.htm.)
- Oil Spill Prevention Summary, Vessel/Transfer Oil Spill Prevention Work Group (12/93)
- Columbia River Bunkering Locations Workshop Summary Report (Summer 1995)
- Vessel Contingency Plan Planning Standards (7/95)
- Wildlife Search, Rescue, and Rehabilitation Guidelines (11/95)

- Oregon Administrative Rules, Chapter 340, Division 47 (Spill Planning Rules)
- Oil Spill Contingency and Prevention Planning Review Manual (4/97)
- New Carissa Review Committee Report (6/00)

For more information on the spill program at DEQ, go to http://www.deq.state.or.us/wmc/cleanup/cugrpmain.htm

Available from:

Spill Prevention, Preparedness, and Response Program
Washington Department of Ecology
P.O. Box 47600
Olympia, WA, 98504-7600

- Spill Prevention, Preparedness, and Response Program Annual Report: 1997-2000
- *Spill Scene* quarterly newsletter: 1997-2001
- North Puget Sound Long-Term Oil Spill Risk Management Panel – Final Report and Recommendations (#00-08-024)
- Neah Bay Rescue Tug – Report to the Washington Legislature (#00-08-023)
- Vessel Entry and Transits for Washington Waters (VEAT): 1993-2000
- Manual for Review of Facility and Vessel Oil Spill Contingency Plans (#99-252)
- Designing and Conducting Oil Spill Drills Guidance Document (#98-251)
- Oil Spills in Washington State: A Historical Analysis (#97-252)
- Guidelines for Determining Oil Spill Volume in the Field (#96-205)
- In Situ Burning Policy and Operational Guidelines (#95-259 [6/95])
- Screening for Acceptable Risk: Washington State's Program for Screening Cargo and Passenger Vessels (Update 1995)
- Contingency Planning Standards
- Bunkering Information Packet
- Related Rules and Regulations
- Prevention Bulletins, Safety Advisory Bulletins
- Geographic Response Plans (updated annually)

  South Puget Sound
  Central Puget Sound
  North Central Puget Sound
  San Juan Island/North Puget Sound
  Hood Canal/Admiralty Inlet
  Strait of Juan de Fuca
  Outer Coast - Washington
  Grays Harbor
  Willapa Bay
  Mid-Columbia River/Bonneville Pool
  Mid-Columbia River/Dalles Pool
  Mid-Columbia River/John Day Pool
  Mid-Columbia River/McNary Pool
  Snake River/Ice Harbor
  Snake River/Lower Monumental
  Snake River/Little Goose
  Snake River/Lower Granite
  Lower Nisqually River



Available from:

The States/British Columbia Oil Spill Task Force
811 SW Sixth Ave.
Portland, OR 97204-1390

(most documents are also available on the Task Force web site at www.env.gov.bc.ca/eeeb/taskforc/tfhome.htm)

- Final Report of the States/British Columbia Oil Spill Task Force: Joint and Jurisdictional Recommendations for Spill Prevention and Response (10/90)
- Preventing Oil Spills: The Perspective from West Coast States and the Province of British Columbia (3/95)
- States/British Columbia Oil Spill Task Force Member Technology and Research Projects (through 2000 only)
- Strategic Plan (1994-1999, 1999-2004)
- Annual Workplans (1993 - 1999)
- Annual Reports (1993 - 1999)
- Quarterly Reports
- 1993 Agreement re: the Marine Oil Spill Response Information System
- 1993 Agreement re: the Incident Command System for a Unified Approach to Marine Oil Spill Response
- 1993 Agreement re: a Mutual Aid Plan
- 1993 Agreement re: a Marine Oil Spill Reporting System
- 1994 Resolution re: Marine Salvage
- 1995 Report and Recommendations on Drills & Exercises
- 1995 Report and Recommendations on Alternative Response Technologies
- 1995 Evaluation Report and Recommendations on Oiled Wildlife Care Facilities
- A Comparison of West Coast Contingency Planning Requirements or Vessels and Oil Handling Facilities (1995)
- A Comparison of West Coast Oil Spill Prevention Programs for Vessels and Oil Handling Facilities (1995)
- 1995 Report and Recommendations to Prevent Marine Oil Spills Caused by Human Error
- 1996 Mutual Aid Agreement
- 1996 Resolution on Vessel Routing
- 1997 Resolution on Delegation of OPA 90
- Report on the Spill and Incident Data Collection Project (1997)
- Report on Marine Pilots and Vessel Safety on the West Coast (1997)
- Report and Guidance Matrix for the Integrated Vessel Response Plan (1998)*
- Protocols for the Care of Oil-affected Marine Mammals and Birds (1998)
- Alternative Response Technology Policies and Issues (1998)
- Protocols for the Care of Oil-affected Marine Mammals (1998)
- Protocols for the Care of Oil-affected Birds (1998)
- Report and Recommendations on Pipeline Spill Prevention on the West Coast (1999)
- Report on the Oil Spill Field Operations Guide (FOG) Update Project (2000)

* IVRP guidance matrix updated as needed